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Introduction
This paper uses the issue of runaway production as a looking glass into the complex
world of Hollywood economics and politics. As such, a broad overview of Hollywood’s
business practices, history, and technology are discussed so the reader can understand how
runaway production (a major issue itself) is one piece of the Hollywood puzzle. Specifically,
this paper attempts to study runaway productions from the Law and Economics approach
described in Judge Richard Posner’s text on the subject. Events in 2006 illustrate the continuing
importance of runaway productions.
At the 2006 Academy Awards, the motion picture industry praised itself its role in
helping rebuild New Orleans and the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Academy President Sid Ganis lauded six movies filmed in New Orleans, which created 600 new
jobs.1
Hollywood’s perceived altruism may be somewhat misplaced. While it’s commendable
that recent film production created 600 new jobs in New Orleans, it’s naive to think that the film
industry’s presence in New Orleans is entirely altruistic. In 2005, before Katrina was on the
radar, movies filmed in Louisiana had a combined budget of $550 million.2 Filming in
Louisiana is not about altruism, it’s about economics.
Louisiana State House Bill 731 (signed by the Governor as Act No. 456), which took
effect on July 1, 2005, allows any motion picture company that spends at least $250,000 in
connection with filming a motion picture to be relieved from paying all state sales and use tax.3

1

Schwartz, Missy. “Southern Comfort; After Katrina, Hollywood Rushed into Louisiana,” ENTERTAINMENT
WEEKLY, March 24, 2006.
2
Susan Roesgen, “Filming in New Orleans,” CNN AMERICAN MORNING, March 20, 2006.
3
H.B 731, Regular Session 2005, (La. 2005).

3

Further, a motion picture production company that spends $1 million or more on payroll for
Louisiana residents receives a 20% employment tax credit. Any Louisiana taxpayer who invests
in a production with a total base investment of less than $8 million will be allowed a tax credit of
10% for their actual investment. If the total base investment exceeds $8 million, a Louisiana
taxpayer is allowed a 15% tax credit for their actual investment.4
With Louisiana’s generous incentives in place, 10 films were in production for 2005, up
from four in 2004 and only one production in 2002.5 Although Hurricane Katrina gave
Hollywood the chance to spin itself as part of the rebuilding effort, it seems Hollywood
executives were truly motivated to film in Louisiana because of tax credits. Indeed, Louisiana’s
previous legislative incentives had dramatic results for the state. From 2002 to 2004, production
budgets for movies, television shows and commercials grew from $11.8 million (2002) to $355
million (2004)—an increase of 2,850%.6
Louisiana’s growth in movie production in recent years is, arguably, positive for the state
(and perhaps Hollywood’s image too), lawmakers in Baton Rouge should be wary. Movie
productions can flee as quickly as they come. Laws expire and other states and nations may
offer a better incentives to lure away movies. If Louisiana loses its touted position as
“Hollywood South,” it will become a victim of runaway production.

4

H.B 731, Regular Session 2005, (La. 2005).
Los Angeles Times, Hollyworld: Runaway Production Map, [hereinafter Runaway Production Map] Available at
http://www.latimes.com/business/custom/cotown/la-hollywoodmap-fl,1,7837298.flash?coll=la-headlines-businessenter
6
The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Global Success of Production Tax Incentives and
the Migration of Feature Film Production From the U.S. to the World: Year 2005 Production Report 63,
[hereinafter 2005 CEIDR Report].
5
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Scope of Paper
This paper is not an exhaustive discussion of runaway production, which is continuously
studied by many sources (many of which are biased and critique each other). Huge amounts of
industry data has been compiled and complex economic models have been applied to reach
varying conclusions. This paper only examines runaway production of theatrical movie
productions; runaway production as it pertains to television shows, mini-series, movies of the
week and commercials is not discussed. Since runaway production is a hot button issue in
Hollywood (and around the world), it serves as an excellent starting point for a newcomer to the
movie industry or a future entertainment attorney seeking to understand the policy issues
runaway production presents and how local, state and national governments have responded.
This paper is split into five parts. Part I provides an overview of the movie business and
how revenue streams and content delivery have changed. Part I also explores the impact of
movie piracy, DVD’s and how Wal-Mart has usurped Blockbuster video and the rental business
in general.
Part II explains what runaway production is, its causes, and the problem of studying its
economic effects. Specifically, Part II analyzes the most recent (from 2006) data on runaway
production, which (along with other evidence) lends weight to the main argument of this paper:
runaway productions are draining the U.S. economy of a vital, quintessentially American
industry. Motion picture employment is surveyed and the negative cultural impacts of runaway
productions is also raised. A discussion of two less recent reports, which differ on the economic
effects of runaway production, is also included to highlight the ongoing tension surrounding the
issue.
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Part III provides an overview of the major players, such as the major studios and labor
unions, in the runaway production battle and the differing methods they employ to curb it.
Specifically, the two main methods to stop runaway productions, which are the subsidy to fight
subsidy approach or getting the WTO to rule film subsidies illegal, are discussed in detail.
Part IV looks at how globalization and runaway productions pose negative societal
costs to certain nations. Part IV also explores and critiques Judge Posner’s Law and Economics
approach to global poverty, the role of labor unions, and crime as it relates to inequality of
wealth.
Part V includes a discussion of legislation enacted to fight runaway production, often
with success, and suggests proposals the United States Federal Government could take to further
combat the loss of the U.S. motion picture industry.

I. Hollywood Today
The Overall State of the Motion Picture Industry
In 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued a report lauding the motion picture
industry as “one the most economically important industries in the United States.”7 For example,
The Commerce Report claimed the film industry employed “more than the number of workers
employed in the steel industry.”8 In 2003, Robert B. Zoellick, then-Ambassador of the Office of
the United States Trade Representative, said the U.S. copyright industry (which includes the
motion picture industry, theatre owners, videogame programmers etc.) employed “4.7 million
Americans” and accounted for 5% of the U.S. GDP.9

7

U.S. Department of Commerce, The Migration of U.S. Films and Television Production 5, (March 2001)
[hereinafter The Commerce Report].
8
The Commerce Report, supra note 7, at 5
9
The Office of the United States Trade Representative, Zoellick Joins Entertainment Industry Launch of
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Industry figures10 show that 2005 domestic box-office sales (tickets sold at the movie
theatres) “remained near $9 billion” (compared to $7.66 billion in 2000).11 Global box-office
sales (including the U.S.) were “over $23 billion…46% higher than the 2000 mark of $16
billion.”12 The number of movies released in 2005 reached “another all time high of 563”
(compared to 528 in 2004 and 411 in 1995).13
Whilel domestic box-office revenues increased substantially over the past five years14,
the number of tickets sold (called admissions) has not. In 2000, U.S. admissions were 1.42
billion. In 2005, however, domestic admissions (while remaining steady overall15) dropped to
1.4 billion.16 Compared to other recreational alternatives such as theme parks and major sporting
events, with admissions of 334 and 134 million respectively, a night at the movies is a preferred

Free Trade Coalition, Press Release 1 (May 13, 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2003/March/Zoellick_Joins_Entertainment_Industry_Launc
h_of_Free_Trade_Coalition.html?ht=.
10
The MPAA is the main source for these numbers, which are in accord with other sources. The MPAA, however,
is not always a reliable source of numbers. For example, in September 2005, The New York Times issued the
following correction: “Hollywood's global revenue in 2004 was $44.8 billion, not $84 billion. Of the total, $21
billion, not $55.6 billion, came from sales of DVDs and Videos.” According to Richard Epstein, the MPAA “sent
bogus figures. Hollywood's DVD revenue alone was inflated by more than $33 billion, possibly to make the
MPAA's war against unauthorized copying appear more urgent.” See Richard Epstein, Pushing the Reality Envelope,
SLATE MAGAZINE, October 31, 2005. Another example of the MPAA’s so-called “bogus figures” is a claim found
on the MPAA web site and in testimony presented before Congress that reads “Nationwide, movies employ over
750,000 people.” The 750,000 number is drastically higher than the MPAA’s own figures from 2004, when it
projected 367,000 jobs. See Testimony Before House Energy and Commerce Committee: Subcommittee Committee
on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong. (2006) (Statement of John Feehery, Executive Vice
President for External Affairs, MPAA) Available at http://mpaa.org/piracy_Economies.asp.
11
Motion Picture Association Worldwide Market Research, “U.S. Theatrical Market: 2005 Statistics,” p. 2
[hereinafter MPA 2005 Statistics].
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
While the box office gross did increase from to 2000-2005, hitting $9 billion in 2005, author Richard Epstein’s
access to the “All Media Report” reveals that when the box office gross from 1948 is adjusted for inflation it was
$7.8 billion in 2004. See http://www.edwardjayepstein.com/mpa2004.htm.
15
In 1985, for example, total U.S. admissions were 1.056 billion and, in 2002, hit a 20-year high of 1.6 billion. See
Id.
16
While admissions have remained relatively stable over the last 20 years (1985-2005), the U.S. box office has
endured drastic drop-offs over its entire history. In 1947, 90 million Americans (the total U.S. population was 151
million) paid to go see a movie on weekly basis and 4.7 billion movie tickets were sold for the entire year. Eleven
years later, in 1958, most American homes had TV sets (a “rarity” in 1947) and the number of tickets sold plunged
to 2 billion. See Richard Epstein, The Vanishing Box Office, SLATE MAGAZINE, July 5, 2005.
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and affordable activity for many Americans.17 In 2005, the average price of a movie ticket was
$6.41 (compared to $4.35 in 1995).18 Despite relatively stable admissions since the 1980’s, the
number of screens doubled from 17,590 in 1980 to 35,594 in 2004.19
The tremendous growth of movie screens in the U.S. and the modest increase of
admissions over the same period is perplexing. In 1947, the box office admissions (tickets sold)
was 4.5 billion tickets and the U.S. population was 150 million. By 2005, the population
doubled, yet box office admissions was just 1.4 billion. Why are there so many screens?
Megaplexes. The growth of megaplex theatres doubled the number of screens since 1980, but
from 1995 to 2003 the number of theatres (which house the screens) decreased from 7,744 to
6,012 .20 For historical contrast, in 1945 there were 18,413 movie theatres.21
Internationally, U.S. films dominate the markets of every major first-world nation.
Foreign governments (and their populations?) fear U.S. dominance and have attempted to foster
local film industries. Thus far, Hollywood is winning the battle. In 2002, 70% of moviegoers in
the European Union spent their money on U.S. films.22 Conversely, foreign language films only

17

MPAA 2005 Statistics, supra note 11, at 7.
MPAA 2005 Statistics, supra note 11, at 25.
19
Id. at 23.
20
Id. at 25.
21
MICHEAL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 48 (University of California Press 1960).
[Hereinafter Conant].
22
Mark Litwak, Features: Runaway Home: Production Incentives From Foreign Jurisdictions are Playing and
Increasing Role in Determining Where Films are Made, LOS ANGLES LAWYER, May 2004.
18
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drew one-half of 1% of the U.S. box office.23 In 2002, Jack Valenti, then-president of the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), proudly reported to Congress that the “movie
industry alone has a surplus balance with every single country in the world. No other American
enterprise can make that statement.”24
When Hollywood Comes to Town
Determining the importance of the movie industry in terms of employment is difficult
because of conflicting numbers from a variety of sources. Job numbers are explored in detail
later in this paper, but they range from 127,000 (1996) to 750,000 (2006). Examining a movie’s
impact, therefore, is perhaps more insightful (and maybe more accurate) if done at the
community level.
Most of the benefits communities receive from filmmaking are occasionally mentioned
in newspapers and law review articles as anecdotal evidence. There are too many stories
splintered across too many sources.

23

In the 1970’s, the percentage of foreign films accounted for 10% of the U.S. box office; in the mid 1980’s foreign
films accounted for roughly 7% of the U.S. box office. The fact that foreign films now account for less than 1% of
the U.S. box office is discussed by Robert W. McChesney, a research professor at the Institute of Communication
Research at the University of Illinois at Urbanana-Champaign. McChesney claims the drop of foreign films as a
percentage of the U.S. box office was a result of the dominance of “chain owned megaplex movie theatres.” The
megaplex’s, according to McChesney, have “far lower” costs than one screen theatres that “had specialized in
foreign fare.” McChesney argues that the loss of small theatres and the disappearance of foreign films refutes the
“popular mythology” that media giants “in their pursuit of greed” will “give the people what they want.”
McChesney asserts:
In fact, corporate media are hardly the obedient servants of this mythology…As much as demand
creates supply, supply creates demand. Media conglomerates are risk-averse and continually
return to what has been commercially successful in the past. Over time, this probably creates a
demand in the fare that is commonly presented. There is little incentive in the system to develop
public taste over time.
ROBERT MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 32-33 (The New Press 2000).
24
If You Cannot Protect What you Own, You Don’t Own Anything: Hearing on Internet Piracy Before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. 147 (2002) (statement of Jack Valenti, President
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America).
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What follows is a compilation of some of these anecdotal stories that, when viewed in
total, may leave the reader with a greater sense of the impact a movie can have on a local
economy:
•

The film “Tin Cup,” a movie about golf starring Kevin Costner, filmed in the Woodlands,
Texas for ten weeks. Production expenses included $22,000 for dry cleaning, $121,000
for hardware and lumber, and $498,000 for location fees to private business.25

•

Kevin Costner’s “Field of Dreams” has been a boon for Iowa. The Iowa baseball field has
drawn 800,000 tourists since the film was nominated for best picture 15 years ago.26

•

Clint Eastwood’s “Bridges of Madison County,” which also filmed in Iowa, increased
tourism by 20% during one year.27

•

In 2003, the Mississippi Film Office created “The Movie Map of Mississippi” to guide
visitors to film locations in the state.28 More than 40 movies and 24 television programs
have filmed in Mississippi. 29 Several years ago, the big screen adaptation of John
Grisham’s (a native of the state) novel “A Time to Kill” filmed in Mississippi and the
production issued 10,000 paychecks to Mississippi residents.30

•

In 1997, Arthur Anderson examined the economic impact of a $14 million movie made in
Chicago, Illinois, over a 90-day period. The study found a “direct economic impact of
over $12.5 million and an indirect of more than $21 million.”31

•

A study by the Dallas Film Commission found that “an average of 300 different non-film
businesses” benefited by providing services to film productions. Expenditures for an
unnamed motion picture included “$420,000 on car rentals, $136,000 on the rental of a
private residence, $66,000 on cell phones, $50,400 on janitorial services, $22,000 on
freeway tolls, and $6,000 on local transportation.”32

25

Article and Essay, Hooray for…Toronto? Hollywood, Collective Bargaining, and Extraterritorial Union Rules in
an Era of Globalization, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55, 63 (2003).
26
Jon Garon, Star Wars: Film Permitting, Prior Restraint & Government's Role in the Entertainment Industry, 17
LOY, L.A. ENT. L.J. 1 (1996).
27
Id.
28
Press Release, Mississippi Film Office, Mississippi Film Office Unveils First Mississippi Film Tourism Map
(January 28, 2003) (on file with author).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Martha Jones, Motion Picture Production in California, California Research Bureau, March 2002 at 21
[hereinafter Jones] (citing Arthur Anderson Report).
32
Commerce Report, Supra note 7, at 22.
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•

New Zealand’s government dubbed the nation as the “home of middle earth” and Air
New Zealand painted its planes with scenes from the three “Lord of the Rings” movies.33
As a result, the number of foreign visitors jumped 16%.34

•

The 2006 blockbuster “Superman Returns” filmed in Australia and injected $80 million
into the local economy, created 800 new jobs, and employed 10,000 people over its eightmonth shoot.35
The decision to shoot “Superman Returns” in Australia did not sit well with some in

Hollywood, who point out that Superman stands for “Truth Justice and the American Way.”
One director quit the production claiming, “When I flew to New York to scout, I became
enamored with our greatest American city. It was clear to me that this was Metropolis. As a
filmmaker, I felt it was inappropriate to try to capture the heart of America on another
continent.”36
Hollywood’s “Real Numbers”
The impressive box office returns domestically and worldwide, the growth of admissions
(though modest the past 20 years), the proliferation of movie screens, and the dominance of U.S.
films in foreign markets paints a rosy picture of the movie industry to the casual observer. What
is shocking (at least to this author) is that Hollywood routinely loses money at the box office.
For example, if a film makes $100 million over its opening weekend at the box office, 50% or

33

Commerce Report, Supra note 7, at 22.
Id.
35
Geoff Boucher, Up, up ... and away; Superman may be quintessentially American, but it's cheaper to film him in
Australia, LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 31, 2005, at E1.
36
Id. In the same article, the film’s producers claimed the director quit the production because he is afraid of flying
over large bodies of water. To be fair, the 1978 Superman film was also shot internationally in Canada and England.
34
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more of the “gross” goes to the theatre.37 The theatre then remits the balance to the studio, which
in turn makes payments to other groups.38
Edward Jay Epstein, who writes about Hollywood economics, explains the harsh reality
box office economics:
The cost of prints and advertising for the opening of a studio film in America in 2003 totaled, on
average, $39 million. That's $18.4 million more per film than studios recovered from box-office
receipts. In other words, it cost more in prints and ads—not even counting the actual costs of
making the film—to lure an audience into theaters than the studio got back.39

This begs the question: how does Hollywood make money? Epstein claims the studios “spoonfeed” their box office numbers to the press, “but they go to great lengths to conceal the other
components of their revenue streams from the public, as well as from the agents, stars, and
writers who may profit from a movie.”40

37

Edward Epstein, Gross Misunderstanding, SLATE MAGAZINE, May 16, 2005.
Edward Epstein provides an example of the so-called “gross” misunderstanding: “Touchstone's Gone in 60
Seconds, which had a $242 million box-office gross. From this impressive haul, the theaters kept $129.8 million and
remitted the balance to Disney's distribution arm, Buena Vista. After paying mandatory trade dues to the MPAA,
Buena Vista was left with $101.6 million. From this amount, it repaid the marketing expenses that had been
advanced—$13 million for prints so the film could open in thousands of theatres; $10.2 million for the insurance,
local taxes, custom clearances, and other logistical expenses; and $67.4 million for advertising. What remained of
the nearly quarter-billion-dollar ‘gross’ was a paltry $11 million. (And that figure does not account for the $103.3
million that Disney had paid to make the movie in the first place.)” Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
38
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The major studios secretly41 supply their “real numbers” (their revenue streams) to their trade
association, the MPAA. Each major studio provides the MPAA with a “detailed breakdown of
the money they actually receive, country by country, from movie theaters, home video, network
television, local television, pay television, and pay-per-view.”42 The MPAA then compiles the
information into a “strictly confidential” document called the “All Media Revenue Report.”43
According to authors Jonathan Bing and David Hayes, a new Hollywood “culture” exists,
which would explain the confidential revenue reports Epstein gained access to:
It’s a culture of pollsters and statisticians obsessed with obscure socioeconomic data. It’s a culture
of distribution executives obsessed with screen counts, rental terms and fucking the competition.
And it’s a culture of third-generation exhibitors obsessed with movie theatre finances…44

41

Actor Tom Cruise, however, was in on the secret revenue streams—specifically, he knew how much money there
is to be made from DVD sales. Cruise’s recent break with Paramount pictures, Epstein opines, was not about the
actor’s off-screen antics. Rather, it was Cruises pay structure that led to the break, according to ex-paramount
executives Epstein interviewed. In the past, the goof news for Paramount is that Cruise did not demand an upfront
payment, which is around $35 million for a big star. According to Epstein:
The bad news is that Mr Cruise gets 22% of the gross revenues received by the studio on the
theatrical release and the television licensing. Even worse, from the studio’s point of view, is Mr
Cruise’s 12% cut of Paramount’s total DVD receipts. What most stars and other Hollywood
participants get is a cut not of the DVD revenue itself but of a 20%“royalty”. The other 80% goes
to a subsidiary of the studio…So, usually stars and other participants get their share of just the
20% royalty. For example, if a star has a 10% participation, he gets 10% of only the 20%, or just
2%. But not Mr Cruise. He insisted – and gained – in his first Mission: Impossible deal ‘100%
accounting’, which means that the studio, after deducting the manufacturing expenses, paid Mr
Cruise his 22% share of the total receipts. As a result, Mr Cruise earned more than $70 million on
Mission: Impossible. Mr Cruise (after DVD’s took off) revised the deal with Paramount. His cut
of the gross was increased to 30% and, for purposes of calculating his share of the DVDs, he
accepted a ‘royalty’ but it was doubled to 40%. So, he would get his whopping 12% of DVD
receipts with no expenses deducted by Paramount. From the DVDs alone, Mr Cruise gained more
than $30 million on Mission: Impossible II. With Mission: Impossible III, Mr Cruise still got his
huge percentage of the gross. Both he and Paramount were, however, disappointed with the
theatrical gross – $393 milllion – even though it has been Paramount’s highest grossing film in
2006.
Thus, because Cruise refused to renegotiate his contract after “Mission Impossible III,” his days at
Paramount ended. See Edward Jay Epstein, Paramount v. Cruise: Countdown to the Killer Cut, FINANCIAL
TIMES, August 24, 2006 at p.13.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
DADE HAYES & JONATHAN BING, OPEN WIDE 14 (Miramax Books, 2004) [hereinafter HAYES & BING].
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Hollywood Economics 101: DVD Sales and Wal-Mart
As Epstein’s access to past “All Media Revenue Reports” reveals, DVD sales, which
increased dramatically in recent years, are the real bread and butter for the movie industry.45 In
2000, 13 million American households owned DVD players and 174.4 million films sold on the
then-new format. In 2004, 65.4 million households owned DVD players and the number of
DVD titles sold exploded to 1.3 billion.46 The price of an average DVD title decreased slightly
from $22.63 in 2000 to $20.52 in 2004 and the average cost of DVD players decreased from
$204 in 2000 to $9047 in 2004.48
Not surprisingly, by 2003 home entertainment sales, most of it from DVD sales, totaled
$33 billion and studios “were taking in almost five times as much revenue from home
entertainment as from theatres.”49
In 2005 alone, Americans spent $16.3 billion on DVD sales and $6.5 billion on DVD
rentals, a total of $22.8 billion.50 Conversely, in 2005, the box office gross (the amount people

45

Thus, while Touchstone (a subsidiary of Disney) lost money at the box office, Disney’s SEC filings in 2005
reported, “Revenues increased 18%, or $1.3 billion, to $8.7 billion, due to increases of $1.4 billion in worldwide
home entertainment and $151 million in television distribution, partially offset by a decrease of $215 million in
worldwide theatrical motion picture distribution. Worldwide home entertainment revenues increased due to higher
DVD unit sales in fiscal 2004.” Walt Disney Corporation, Form 10-K Annual Report 47, (October 1, 2005)
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001039/000095014805000128/v14978e10vk.htm#102
46
MPAA 2005 Statistics, supra note 11, at 30.
47
While the “average cost” of a DVD player was $90 in 2005, retail giant Wal-Mart sold DVD players as low a as
$25. The provider of Wal-Mart’s $25 DVD machines was California-based APEX Digital Inc., which trailed Sony,
the number one provider of U.S. DVD players. Also in 2005, however, Chinese authorities arrested a top APEX
executive in China and alleged the company of fraud. Fraud charges aside, it’s doubtful APEX could turn a profit in
the long-term. One firm estimates APEX’s cost of materials is $25, “tops.” To keep assembly costs low, APEX,
like many manufacturers, went to China. Workers at one APEX’s largest Chinese facilities earned about $55 a
month. See Prachi Patel Predd, The Price is Wrong, SPECTRUM MAGAZINE (August 2005).
48
MPAA 2005 Statistics, supra note 11, at 33-35.
49
EDWARD EPSTEIN, THE BIG PICTURE 20 (Random House Inc, New York, 2005) [hereinafter EPSTEIN]
50
DVD News Press Release, Consumer Spending Reaches $24.3 Billion
For Yearly Home Video Sales, DVDinformation.com, January 6, 2006, available at
http://www.dvdinformation.com/News/press/CES010506.htm

14

spent at theatres) was $8.99 billion.51 From 1999-2005, the combined sales and of rentals of
DVD totaled $81.7 billion52; from 2000-2005, box office revenues $53.61 billion.53
The data in the preceding paragraph tends to rebut the argument that runaway production
(i.e. offshoring or outsourcing) lowers costs to consumers. Globalization and free trade,
according to its proponents, lowers prices for the American consumer. The cost of movie tickets,
however, continues to rise and the price for an average DVD title decreased just $2.00 in four
years (according to the MPAA, whose numbers are not always grounded in reality).
Bringing doubt to the MPAA report on modest price declines of DVD titles is their
“everyday low price” at retail juggernaut Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is responsible for 30 to 40% of
all DVD titles sold in the U.S. and is in position to lower the price of DVD titles dramatically for
the American consumer.54 Wal-Mart did not earn its position as a DVD powerhouse by any evil
corporate practices, which critics would have us believe. Rather, Wal-Mart benefited from the
mistake of media mogul Summer Redstone, the head of Viacom, a massive conglomerate that
used to own Blockbuster Video.55

51

MPAA 2005 Statistics, supra note 11, at 4.
See supra note 50. DVDinformation.com uses data gatherred by the Digital Entertinment Group (DEG).
According to The Economist, “DEG's numbers ignore the fact that stores return unsold DVDs. Nor do its numbers
reflect the fact that studios have lowered DVD prices for some categories, such as classic films. Sanford Bernstein,
an investment research firm, predicts that the rate of growth of DVD sales in dollars (as opposed to units) will slow
to 9% in 2005 and 4% in 2006.” The slow growth rate in DVD sales in recent years is mostly attributable to slow
slaes of “Shrek 2” and “The Incredibles.” According to an unnamed executive at a rival media firm, however, the
declines “were specific to them (“Shrek 2” and “The Incredibles”), and should not be extrapolated to the whole
DVD market. Although the market is maturing, he says, '6% growth now is still worth a huge amount in dollar terms
because the market has got so big.’ See The Economist, The Way We Were, August 25, 2005.
53
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Blockbuster Video’s Mistake and Decline
In 1998, Warren Lieberfarb, then chief of Warner Brothers home-video division, offered
Blockbuster Video CEO John Antioco a proposal that would have made the transition from video
rentals to DVD rentals an easy one—nothing would change except DVD’s would replace tapes.
Lieberfarb offered the creation of a rental window for DVD’s, during which new movies
released on DVD would not be available for purchase.56 In what may be one of the biggest acts
of corporate hubris, Blockbuster rejected Lieberfarb’s proposal.
At the time of the offer (1998), the video rental business provided the studios with $10
billion in revenue, half of which Blockbuster generated.57 In turning down the rental window
offer, Blockbuster spurned the opportunity to rent new DVD titles before they went on sale to the
public. Warner Brothers (which launched the DVD format with Sony) wanted 40% of the rental
revenues that Blockbuster received from DVD rentals, which was the same percentage the
studios received from VHS rentals.58 Several years before the DVD format arrived, Redstone
arrogantly claimed, “The studios can’t live without a video rental business—we (Blockbuster)
are your profit.”59
Enter Wal-Mart. The retail giant seized on the opportunity to use DVD’s as an
“enormous traffic-builder for its stores” and it began selling DVD’s “like hot cakes.”60 By 2003,
Wal-Mart replaced Blockbuster as the studios’ single largest source of revenue.61 Other retailers
followed Wal-Mart’s example and often priced newly released DVD’s below wholesale price to
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attract customers who, the retailers hoped, would buy additional products with much higher
profit margins.62
Sell thru DVD’s decimated Blockbuster’s rental business. In its heyday, Blockbuster
opened new stores on a weekly basis. By 2005, Blockbuster’s 4,000 brick and mortar locations
proved a liability.63 Blockbuster was losing money: $1.62 billion in 2002, $978.7 million in
2003, and $1.24 billion in 2004.64 By 2006, Blockbuster had an estimated market value of under
$700 million; Redstone purchased Blockbuster in 1994 for an astounding $8.4 billion.65
With the arrival of downloading movies on demand and other technologies, Epstein is
doubtful Blockbuster can survive, “[downloading movies] is the Holy Grail for Hollywood, since
it both cuts out the middlemen like Blockbuster and leaves the studios in control over their own
products.”66
Epstein sums up Blockbuster’s future as follows:
As far the studios are concerned, other than collecting the money that Blockbuster owes them for
past movies, the video chain has little relevance to their future. Viacom perspicuously divorced
itself from Blockbuster by spinning it off to its shareholders, and, as one Viacom executive told
me, ‘Blockbuster will certainly not survive and it will not be missed.’ It is another zombie in
Hollywood.67
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Movie Piracy: Hollywood’s Great Concern
In addition to devastating Blockbuster, DVD’s also threaten the motion picture industry
in terms of movie piracy.68 Indeed, a 2005 report commissioned by the MPA claimed, “Piracy is
the biggest threat to the U.S. motion picture industry.”69 In 2005 alone, the major studios lost
$6.1 billion to piracy worldwide, with 80% of the piracy coming from overseas and 20% in the
U.S.70 Of the $6.1 billion loss, 62% came from so-called “hard piracy” which primarily involves
burning illegal DVD’s, and 38% of the loss came from internet piracy.71 If the loss is expanded
to include the entire spectrum beyond the major studios to include foreign and domestic
producers, theatres and video stores etc., the total loss to the industry in 2005 grows to $18.5
billion.72
Hollywood’s major nemesis, at least in the long-term, in the piracy battle is China, where
90% of the estimated revenue is lost to piracy.73 In terms of dollars lost to piracy in mature
international markets, the major offenders are Mexico ($483 million loss in 2005), the United
Kingdom ($406 million) and France ($322 million).74 Thus, while there was a greater loss in
actual dollars from Mexico, England and France, China (and to a lesser extent Russia and
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Eastern Europe) pose a greater long-term threat to the industry because of rapid growth in their
national economies and the high rates of piracy taking place in those locations.
Since most consumer electronics such as DVD players75 and disks are manufactured in
China, copyright pirates can burn professional grade DVD’s from digital masters of the movie
title. These pirated copies come with the same sound quality, picture quality and DVD extras
contained on the original. High quality DVD’s sell in China for roughly $1.25, which is less
than the price of movie ticket in Shanghai.76 Much to the dismay of the major studios, the
Chinese population rarely goes to movie theatres; they buy carts full of illegal DVD’s instead.77
DVD’s priced at $15, the official non-pirated retail price in China, do not sell well in China, but
the $1.25 illegal copies sell an estimated 1.3 billion copies per year.78
In the United States, the Executive Branch acting under authority of the President, has the
ability bring trade complaints to the World Treaty Organization (WTO). Unfortunately, the
Bush Administration has done little to pressure China into cracking down on piracy. From 2000
to 2004, the Bush Administration brought just 10 WTO cases against nations accused of
violating trade rules. By contrast, in the 41-month period before Bush came to office, the
Clinton Administration brought 33 (triple the number of cases filed under Bush) WTO
complaints against other nations.79 Only one WTO complaint filed by the Bush Administration
was against China and concerned semiconductors.80 In 2006, the Office of the U.S. Trade
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Representative reported “China’s share of infringing goods seized at the border is more than ten
times greater than that of any other U.S. trading partner.”81
China is also linked to Hollywood revenues because of its ties to Wal-Mart, which is
expanding operations (as a retailer and purchaser) in China.82 Overall, 70% of all products sold
by Wal-Mart are made in China and 80% of the 6,000 factories that supply Wal-Mart are
Chinese.83 By purchasing manufactured goods (like DVD’s) in China for resale in its retail
operations in the U.S., Wal-Mart can offer low prices because of cheap labor and the unregulated
nature of the Chinese manufacturing sector. Moreover, the success of pirated copies sales in
China has not gone unnoticed by Wal-Mart, which wants to turn pirating into a business model
(legally, of course).
Wal-Mart wants to make DVD’s cheaper in the U.S. by placing kiosks in its stores that
could burn DVD’s on demand to meet a consumer’s request.84 Unlike the pirates Hollywood
detests, Wal-Mart would pay a licensing fee to the studios for each copy it burns.85 The
advantage to the consumer is that he could choose the title, specify the format, bonus extras, and
pay less. Studios would benefit by eliminating the cost of manufacturing, packaging and
warehousing DVD’s, which Wal-Mart would handle. Wal-Mart just needs to work out one detail:
how much in licensing fees per copy they pay the studios. According to Epstein, Wal-Mart’s
current proposal is $3 to $4 for older movies, which is not much below what the studios currently
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receive by selling DVD’s to Wal-Mart.86 The danger for the studios is that once a licensing
scheme is established, in the future they could come under pressure from Wal-Mart to reduce the
licensing fee.87
The Changing Hollywood Business Model
Given the astronomical growth in DVD sales and profits in the last 10 years, there is
reason to believe that Hollywood movies, in terms of their content, audience and (maybe)
profitability are on the verge of a major shift. From 1984 to 2004, the cost of making and
marketing (note they are separate costs) movies increased dramatically. First, the actual cost of
making a movie (referred to as negative costs in the industry) rose from $14.4 million (1984) to
$63.6 million (2005), an increase of 341%. Second, the cost of marketing a movie rose from
$6.7 million (1984) to $34.4 million (2004), an increase of 413%. Given that box office revenue
(only about half of which the studio gets) rose 134% over the same period, the sharp rise in
negative and marketing costs appears inexplicable.
Beginning in 1985, the studios’ receipts from home video rentals/sales (mostly VHS
rentals) doubled every five years until the mid-1990s.88 In 2000, studio receipts from home
video and DVD (which arrived in 1997) sales and rentals were $11.67 billion (for 2003 inflation
adjusted dollars).89 In 1985, (again in 2003 inflation adjusted dollars) studio receipts from home
video sales and rentals were $2.34 billion.90 In 2003, studio receipts (now most of them from
DVD sales) from home video and DVD sales and rentals soared to $18.9 billion.91 Most
significantly, until the late 1990’s, most of these receipts were from home video rentals, not sales.
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When the video rental business was booming, the studios employed an interesting
economic model to maximize profits. For many years, the studios charged a wholesale price of
$60 to $80 or more on most videos because: (1) it reduced the likelihood of piracy; (2) the
studios thought they could make more money selling a few expensive copies to video stores than
they could by selling lots of inexpensive copies to retail consumers92 and; (3) keeping the
wholesale price high protected the then-valuable video rental business.93
The result of this model, according to Epstein, was:
Video chains like Blockbuster mechanically pegged their orders, which could range from 1,000
copies to 300,000 copies for a single title, on the results of the theatrical opening. So did pay-TV
channels, such as HBO. And, since movies were typically released overseas many months after
their American debuts, studios could use impressive U.S. box-office numbers to wrangle more
94
advantageous play dates in foreign markets.

Since the studios knew the business model employed by rental chains, they spent massive
amounts of money on marketing movies and booking them on thousands of screens to maximize
opening weekend revenue. In 1997, only 27% of a movies total box office gross came on the
first week of release, in 2003, however, that number jumped to 41%.95 Thus, the 413% increase
in marketing costs from 1984 to 2004, paid off because receipts from video sales and rentals
increased 707% over roughly the same period (1985-2003).
Epstein questions whether high marketing costs are still justified. Wal-Mart and other
mass retailers replaced Blockbuster and the rental business as the studios’ single largest source of
revenue in 2003, and, unlike video stores, Wal-Mart does not peg their orders to box office
revenues.96
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New technology makes coming to market make Hollywood’s future revenue streams
even more difficult, arguably impossible, to predict. First, Blu-Ray and HD-DVD players are
competing to replace the DVD format and there is no consensus on which technology will
prevail. If consumers hesitate to purchase one of the new formats, it could hurt movie sales.
Second, the emergence of video on demand may entirely usurp movie sales be they DVD, HDDVD or Blue-Ray.
Box Office Decline and Hollywood’s Changing Demographic
From 1947 to 1958, box office admissions dropped precipitously from 4.7 billion (1947)
to 2 billion (1958).97 Admissions continued to drop until the mid 1980’s. In recent years,
however, admissions have trended back up to the 1958 level. Two conventional reasons widely
cited for the box office drop are: the advent of television and the United States Supreme Court
Decision in United States v. Paramount in 1948.
The penetration of television into a majority of homes clearly impacted the number of
people going to the movies, but other factors may have helped foster the decline. In 1960,
Professor Michael Conant, of the University of California, studied the attendance drop and
claimed that, in addition to television, the “large postwar sale of automobiles permitted” leisure
activities that were formerly inaccessible without a car.98 Furthermore, Conant argued, the
“sharp increase in the birthrate following the war kept a significant sector of the younger adults
[at home] caring for babies.”99
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Paramount, however, did not contribute to the declining
attendance at the movies. Rather, the Paramount decision affected the studios revenues. Prior to
the Paramount ruling, the major studios, in addition to making films, owned their own theatre
chains. The Supreme Court held that the studio’s distribution scheme violated anti-trust laws. In
effect, the studios “could either make pictures or operate theatres—they couldn’t do both.”100
Before the Paramount decision in 1948, the American box office accounted for almost all
of the studios’ revenue. In 1947, “the six major studios earned over 95% of their revenue from
their share of ticket sales.”101 This revenue amounted to $1.1 billion, which made movies
America’s third largest retailer behind grocery stores and automotive sales.102
According to former President Ronald Reagan103, the government’s decision to break up
the studio system was “wrong”:
They (the studios) didn’t have a monopoly; there was intense competition that worked well for
everybody. You had seven companies who were always competing with each other to turn out a
better movie than the guy down the street, and if people didn’t like a picture, they’d show it by
voting with their feet.104

Reagan claimed that owning theatres guaranteed studios a way to recoup some of their
money “if they guessed wrong on a movie.”105 Allowing the studios to own theatres “allowed
them to take risks on people and stories.”106 As President, Reagan supported free and fair trade
but cautioned, “for the free market to work, everyone has to compete on an equal footing.”107
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Unfortunately, President Reagan did not define “fair trade” and “equal footing.” Clearly,
runaway production involves offshoring and outsourcing overseas by the American movie
industry. It is true that filming abroad purports to reduce costs, leaving a larger profit margin for
the studios, but it is not clear that there is “equal footing” in the movie industry global labor pool.
People aged 12-24 years old comprise the overwhelming demographic of the movie
theatre audience.108 Hence, the most profitable movies target this demographic. Interestingly,
the age of Hollywood’s key demographic is frequently pointed to as a reason for the changing
nature of films artistic expression, which is commonly perceived as a negative development.
This argument, however, is not persuasive because the age demographic of movie audiences
today is not substantially different from 1957, when 52% of the audience was under 20 years old
and 72% was under 30.109
No doubt there has been a shift in the nature of filmmaking. This shift, however, has not
been the result of audience demographics. Rather, the demographic change affecting modern
filmmaking comes from the transformation of the major Hollywood studios.
From the 1930’s to the early 1970’s, the major studios were perceived as goliaths. Since
that time, multinational corporations and media conglomerates have taken over major studios,
turning Hollywood into a true corporate town. Academy Award winning actor and producer
Michael Douglas explained the shift as follows:
Well, as huge as we thought, or even my father thought, the studios were back in the 1940s and
1950s and how powerful they were, it's taken us this amount of time to realize that they were just a
little tiny cottage industry.
Now you've got a bunch of huge multinational corporations trying to cannibalize each other to a
fair degree in the movie business. You know, you have to have your movie open on the opening
weekend. A picture like "Cuckoo's Nest," could play for week after week with only maybe a 7
percent drop, as opposed to some of the dramatic drops that are now. So it's much more a business.
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It was always a struggle between art and commerce. And now, I think, commerce is winning out,
big time. We're seeing a dramatic reduction in producers associated with studios. Just today there
was in the papers a list, my company included, of the huge number of very prestigious production
companies that are not associated with studios directly now. So you're seeing a quarterly profits
mentality creeping in, more and more. There's talk of this vertical integration -- acquisitions of all
different types of companies under one umbrella. It's a much riskier business now, and so big
business is trying to make it much more cost-efficient. We'll see.110

Douglas’ observations are echoed by Peter Bart, a former film executive for MGM and
Paramount and the editor in chief of Variety, Hollywood’s leading trade magazine:
It's only in relatively recent years that Hollywood became the playground of multinational
corporations which regard movies and TV shows as a minor irritant to their overall activity. So it's
become a corporate town, reduced to one sentence, "a very corporate town." It was not a corporate
town 10, 15 years ago.
The decision-making process for movies has become so complex that producers and even agents
and directors are all thrown. The best way to describe it is what they call a "green-light" meeting.
A green-light meeting is when the decision is made finally whether or not to make a given picture.
The green-light meeting, when I first started at Paramount, would consist of maybe three or four of
us in a room. Perhaps two or three of us would have read the script under discussion. And people
said stupid things like, "I kind of like this movie." Or, "I look forward to seeing this movie." Inane
things like that.
The green-light decision process today consists of maybe of 30 or 40 people. There's one group
there to discuss the marketing tie-ins. How much will McDonald's or Burger King put up? There's
somebody else there to discuss merchandising toy companies and so forth. Someone else is there
to discuss what the foreign co-financiers might be willing to put up. So everyone is discussing the
business aspects of this film. And it's sometimes unusual for someone actually to circle back and
talk about the script, the cast, the package -- whether the whole damn thing makes any sense to
begin with.111

How and why Hollywood went from a cottage industry to a corporate town is not the
subject of this paper, but a brief explanation is useful. The birth of the blockbuster, starting with
Steven Spielberg’s film “Jaws” and followed by other blockbusters such as “Star Wars” and
“Superman” showed the world an unprecedented a level of financial success in the movie
business. Big business saw that there was big money to be had in Hollywood.
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Peter Guber, a former studio chief at Columbia Pictures, claimed corporations were
drawn to the movie industry like “the moth drawn to the flame”:
What is the attraction of a French water company, [Vivendi], to buying a movie studio in
Hollywood? What is the attraction of multinational consumer electronics companies -- two of
them, Panasonic and Sony -- to buying companies in Hollywood? What is the attraction of a
Canadian spirits company, Seagrams, to buying a company in Hollywood?
I think it's like the moth drawn to the flame. There's something that you can't get quite anywhere
else. It's the reason for programs like this. It's the attraction of the storyteller. There's something in
the magic of the lights that is inextricably true for all human beings. There's something about the
magic of the shaman, the storyteller in front of the flickering images of the campfire that forever in
our species have wowed us, from the very, very beginning. 112

Further altering demographics of the movie industry was the fallout from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Paramount, which forced theatre owners to find new revenue streams. Since
movie theatre owners split their proceeds with the studios, their largest source of profit is from
popcorn, which has a 90% return (candy, soda and other concessions have similar returns).113
Popcorn also has the added benefit of making people thirsty, “forcing” them to purchase
oversized beverages. The oversized drinks, in turn, causes bathroom breaks, which lead the
customer back by the concession stands. The effect of this, Epstein says, is that “theater owners
don't benefit from movies with gripping or complex plots, since that would keep potential
popcorn customers in their seats.”114 Furthermore, Epstein explains:
Theater owners prefer movies whose length does not exceed 128 minutes. If a movie runs longer
than that, and the theater owners do not want to sacrifice their on-screen advertising time, they will
reduce the number of their evening audience "turns" or showings from three to two, which means
that 33 percent fewer people pass their popcorn stands.115

Given the profits from concessions, theatre owners have little incentive to raise ticket
prices, which they would have to split. There is a consensus among industry experts that most
Americans dislike going to movie theatres because of commercials, rude audiences and cell
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phones.116 Some theatres have installed devices to block cell phones, but if the primary
demographic is the one using the phones, blocking their use might shrink attendance. Lastly,
with the rise of megaplexes, it’s not uncommon for customers to pay for one movie and stay for
two or more, which is essentially piracy, but again: theatre owners have little incentive to crack
down on theatre hopping because it increases concession sales and prevents the customer from
going to a competing theatre.
The point of the preceding section is to illustrate how the fundamental structure of
Hollywood has changed from privately owned movie studios to a corporate town. The decline in
theatre attendance with the advent of television and other factors. The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Paramount drastically altered the studios revenue streams and changed the operations of theatre
chains. New dynamics are at play in the era of globalization and the discussion of Blockbuster’s
decline, the importance of DVD’s and Wal-Mart’s presence in the industry showcase the uphill
battle facing runaway production opponents. Their cause, in the corporate arena, is almost
irrelevant when compared to piracy. The fact remains, however, that the economics of
Hollywood rest on the creation of movies. Thus, the creation of a movie is what makes the
industry tick and runaway production cannot be ignored.
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II. Runaway Production
What Is Runaway Production?
Although there is no official definition of runaway production, Dr. Martha Jones, who
works for the California State Legislature’s Research Bureau, provided a succinct definition:
Runaway production refers to films that were conceptually developed in the United States, but
filmed somewhere else. If the conversation is at the federal level, runaway production goes to
other countries. If at the state level, production that goes to other states is runaway.117

Many in Hollywood think that runaway production is a Hollywood problem-- a problem
for California at most. For Hollywood residents fearful of runaway production, a film shot in
Louisiana or New York is as much a runaway as one shot in Canada or Australia. This
Hollywood-centric view of the runaway production problem (if we assume runaway production
is a problem) clouds the issue. Filmmakers and industry employees in major filming centers
such as Vancouver, Toronto, London and Prague etc. are just as concerned about losing
productions to other locales as their counterparts in Hollywood.118
Runaway Production Is Not New to Hollywood
While runaway production has become a larger and more contentious issue facing the
motion picture industry in recent years, it is certainly nothing new. In 1957, the Hollywood
American Federation of Labor (AFL) Film Council, composed of 28 AFL-CIO unions,
commissioned a report on the economic state of the motion picture industry. According to the
AFL report, prior to 1949 only an “insignificant” number of motion pictures filmed outside of
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the United States.119 From 1949 to 1957, however, the report claimed that of the 314 films
produced by the four major studios at that time, 159, or 50.6%, filmed in other nations such as
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Mexico 120
In 1961, actor Charlton Heston (who would go on to become the president of the National
Rifle Association) testified alongside the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) before a Congress on the
impact runaway production on employment in the U.S.121 At the hearing, foreign subsidies were
identified as the primary cause of runaway production so Heston and SAG officials urged
Congress to “fight subsidy with subsidy.”122 The appeals to Congress failed and the runaway
production remains. Indeed, in 2006, runaway productions again represent about 50% of
theatrical releases.123
The Problem of Quantifying Runaway Production
It is essential to acknowledge that traditional economic theories employed to study
traditional American industries (the automotive industry for example) are not well suited to
dissect the entertainment industry. Since runaway production is essentially outsourcing, it is
tempting to equate it to the offshoring of the automobile industry. Economist Harold Vogel
offers the following caveat:
Industries that require sizable capital investments, like feature films, can normally be expected to
evolve into purely oligopolistic forms with only a few very large firms, such as in steel and
automobile manufacturing. Movies, however, are not a homogeneous product but are each
uniquely designed and packaged. The result is a combination of large oligopolistic organizations
that interface with and depend on small, specialized service and production firms.124
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The unique nature of the entertainment industry poses obstacles to economists and
students of law and economics. Movies are not made in manufacturing plants and they do not
offer stable employment because filming a movie is a short term project lasting an average of
three months. The difficulty of studying and explaining Hollywood economics is further
compounded by statistics and reports from a vast variety of sources that reveal, as Jones terms it,
“astounding imprecision.” Thus, the impact of runaway production and gathering accurate
economic data on the motion picture industry as a whole is difficult, to say the least.
Jones illustrates this difficulty:
Although there is no doubt that motion picture production is of major economic
importance in California, attempts to quantify that importance are troubled by remarkable
variation and statistical softness. For example, the Motion Picture Association of
America estimates that the entertainment industry generated $27.5 billion in California in
1996, compared with a U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis estimate of $13.1 billion.
Estimates of the number of people employed in motion picture production in California
in 1996 vary from 127,000 to 480,000.125

Jones notes the difficulty of gathering reliable data on runaway productions, which is
essentially a subset of the overall Hollywood economic black hole:
Data collection methods vary, resulting in different estimates. Feature film production often takes
place in multiple locations, so keeping track of productions accurately is a challenge. Moreover,
the ups and downs of the industry mean the numbers vary considerably from year to year, making
it difficult to infer long-term trends.126

Dueling Reports on the Impact of Runaway Production
Since the impact of runaway production on the Unites States and studio numbers are
imprecise and contested, it is useful for newcomers to compare impact data of runaway
productions compiled from the widely cited Monitor Report and a newer, less cited, report by
Neil Craig and Associates. The Monitor Report was commissioned by SAG and the DGA,
which are prominent labor unions in Hollywood opposed to runaway production. The Craig
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Report was commissioned by a variety of Canadian labor unions that favor runaway production,
so long as it goes to Canada.
The Monitor Group, which produced the Monitor Report, is a large management and
consulting firm with many offices, including a branch in Santa Monica, California. From 1990
to 1998, the share of all “U.S. developed” film and television programs identified as runaway
productions increased from 14% (1990) to 27% (1998).127 In 1998, according to the Monitor
Report, the U.S. suffered an economic loss (composed of lost production spending and tax
revenue) of $10.3 billion, compared to $2 billion in 1990. In 1998 the U.S. lost “more than
20,000” full time jobs.128 Using the divergent employment statistics noted by Jones in 1996
(which covered only industry employment in California), a loss of 20,000 jobs (if accurate) out
of 127,000 or 480,000 is significant.
At the other end of the spectrum is the 2004 report by Neil Craig Associates, a consulting
firm based in Toronto. The Craig Report claims the economic impact in 1998 on the U.S. was
not $10.3 billion (as claimed by the Monitor Report) but rather $1.7 billion (which is still
considerable).129 The Craig Report is unapologetic to opponents of runaway production in the
U.S. noting that Canada has been an asset to Hollywood over the years and that “they have
earned their role in the global industry.”130
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A strong argument made by the Craig Report is the Monitor Report’s failure to recognize
the balance of trade and the revenue repatriated by the U.S.:
In 2003, more than $1.3 billion flowed out of Canada to the U.S. as net revenues from
cinema admissions, sales and rental of video cassettes and DVDs, broadcast license
fees and other revenues. This is what Canadians spent for the right to view U.S. movies
and television programs, net of distribution expenses. Between 1998 and 2003, the
amount repatriated to the United States from the distribution of U.S. movies and
television programs in Canada was more than $6.5 billion.131

To be fair, Canadian workers are not being “exploited” by Hollywood. Movie production
has not shifted to Canada so studios can maximize profits by using slave labor, which is common
among manufacturing industries in third world nations. Canadian film workers are well
compensated and value their jobs. In sum, outsourcing jobs to Canada has not perpetuated the
economic disparity between the first and third world that benefit large corporations, which (from
a cost savings perspective) would prefer to keep the status quo in impoverished nations to keep
production costs down. If we assume that all nations should have comparable standards of living,
then Canada might serve as a model for outsourcing.
The Craig Report implies that runaway production is more desirable than moving
automobile production to China because of cheap labor and little government regulation.
The report touts the benefits of Canada’s tax incentives and subsidies:
These measures help to attract work in an economic sector that is generally high wage, high
profile, involves leading edge technologies and is environmentally benign.132

The Craig report indirectly makes the point that Canada is no different from the U.S. states with
their own incentives to lure Hollywood productions, like Louisiana. The assumption, however,
is flawed: Canada, as a nation, has greater economic footing than U.S. states.
Despite the differences between the two reports, there are several considerations to keep
in mind. First, the reports duel on the issue of runaway productions to Canada, not other
131
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international locations. Second, while the reports differ on numbers, the disagreement is one of
degree. The Craig Report does not claim that runaway production is minimal or nonexistent.
Causes of Runaway Production
While there are many factors that cause runaway production, it is important to recognize
that a decision to film abroad or domestically is highlighted by Hollywood’s transformation from
a cottage industry to a corporate town. As one law journal observed:
Lone movie moguls no longer run the studios, as in the days of Chaplin, Selznick, Fox, and Mayer,
among others. Instead they are run by corporate executives who work for media conglomerates News Corp., Viacom, America Online-Time Warner, and Disney.133

Hollywood has changed over the years, and the studios are now owned by multinational
corporations which owe no duty to the U.S. or any other nation. Further, these corporations do
not depend on the studios as “the principal way any of them made their money”:
Even when all the earnings from movies’ theatrical releases, video and DVD sales, and television
licensing—both domestic and international—were included in their movie businesses, they
accounted for only a small part of each company’s total earnings. In 2003 Viacom earned 7% of
its total income from its movie business; Sony, 19%; Disney, 21%; News Corporation, 19%; Time
Warner, 18%; and General Electric, if it had counted Universal Pictures as part of its conglomerate
that year, less than 2%. So while the film business may have held great social, political, or
strategic significance to each company, it was no longer the principal way any of them made their
money.134

Several factors commonly used to explain why runaway production occurs include tax
incentives, favorable exchange rates, rising costs in the U.S., and globalization. Some of these
factors appear to have weight and some appear to be educated guesses. The recent increase of
movie production in Louisiana, aforementioned, provides weight to the argument that tax
incentives and rebates are the primary cause of runaway productions.
While the motion picture industry claims rising production costs in the U.S. is a factor
leading to runaway production, it’s not clear what these rising “costs” are. In fact, corporate data
133
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obtained from MGM from 2006 shows overhead and distribution costs significantly declined in
recent years. From 1997 to 2001, MGM decreased overhead and distribution costs from 24.6%
(1997) to 10.8% (2001) through corporate restructuring and distribution methods.135 Thus,
couldn’t it be argued that corporate inefficiencies caused rising production costs and further
corporate restructuring could resolve the runaway production problem?
Steven Katz, an Academy Award winner for the co-development of Dolby Stereo and
author of all CEIDR reports on runaway production, predicts that major Hollywood stars will see
their salaries shrink as studios seek to control costs. As Epstein claims, there are fewer
“desirable stars” than film projects and, as a result, their compensation skyrocketed.136 In 2003,
top Hollywood stars received between $20 and $30 million in fixed compensations and a
percentage of the films total revenue after paying for cash outlays.137 If studios refused to pay
such high salaries, and paid $1 to $5 million for top talent, it would more than wipe out the cost
savings of shooting abroad. Indeed, if salary cuts happened, the U.S. would be more affordable
to film in even without tax incentives or subsidies.
Perhaps the most quantifiable factor influencing runaway productions are favorable
exchange rates in other nations, specifically Canada. In the past 20 years, the value of the U.S.
dollar has increased in relation to the value of the Canadian dollar. As a result, production costs
in Canada reduced as much as 23% in the past 10 years.138 The argument that favorable
exchange rates help cause runaway production are not often challenged by law review journals
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and news articles. The Craig Report, however, found the relationship between exchange rates
and levels of movie production to be “far from conclusive.”139
The Craig Report studied the exchange rate between the U.S. and Canada from 19972003. When the Canadian dollar was at its strongest (with a .723 cents exchange rate in 1997),
production spending in Canada was $561 million, the lowest of the period studied.140 By
contrast, when the Canadian dollar was at its second highest peak (.683 cents in 1999), studios
spent $977 million on Canadian production. Moreover, when the Canadian exchange rate
increased from .640 in 2002 to .653 in 2003, production spending increased from $1.06 billion
(2002) to $1.17 billion (2003),141 thus illustrating that the exchange rate factor may not be a
strong argument. Further weakening the exchange rate argument on lowering production costs is
the failure to consider how weaker currencies affect profitability at foreign box offices, which
account for half of the studios box office revenues. According to Vogel, a strong dollar is
associated with lower foreign ticket revenues and studio profitability.142
Another argument is that cheap labor in poor nations lures Hollywood productions. Like
the exchange rate argument, however, the availability of cheap labor and its relationship to an
increase of movie production is also “far from conclusive,” considering that labor friendly
Canada is the number one destination for runaway productions. On the other hand, according to
labor statistics from 1987, residents from right-to-work states (where workers are not forced into
joining unions) employed on movie and television projects earned roughly 83% less than
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residents in non-right-to-work states.143 Moreover, the level of fringe benefits in right-to-work
states was 3% of the payroll compared to 32% in Southern California.144 Based on the
discrepancies in pay and benefits between U.S. states, economic incentives based on cheap labor
alone cannot be ignored. Indeed, as Vogel claims, “it is possible to produce a film with no
noticeable qualitative differences for up to 40% less in nonunion or flexible-union territories
outside of Hollywood.”145
Vogel’s claim that a film can be produced for 40% less in nonunion areas does not
weaken the argument against runaway production from the U.S. perspective. The workers may
receive less pay, but the jobs remain domestic. The troubling development now is producers
who are seeking savings by going abroad, but not to locations where labor costs (i.e. slave labor)
offset production costs by 40%. The majority of all runaway productions from the U.S. go to
Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.146 According to The Los Angeles Times, from 2001
to 2005, 147 U.S. feature films were produced in Canada, which is the location of choice for
major Hollywood studios.147 The minimum weekly salary of an assistant director in Canada is
$2,927; in the U.S., it is $3,285 (a savings of 11%).148 Thus, if cheap labor in Canada and other
industrialized nations has been the motivating factor that drives runaway productions, it is
because of tax incentives that make labor cheap.
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Low wages, thus far, have not been a major cause of runaway productions. In Romania,
for example, labor costs can be 80% cheaper than American labor.149 According to one film
executive, a driver working on a movie in Los Angeles can earn as much as $470 a day; in
Bucharest the daily rate for the same job may be as low as $9.52.150 There is anecdotal evidence
that workers in Romania are highly skilled and there is “no noticeable qualitative differences” in
their work, as Vogel predicted.151 While movie production in Romania has increased recently,
only eight U.S. movies filmed there from 2001 to 2005.152 That said, third-world nations, such
as Romania and Morocco, have cheap labor because their standard of living and national
economies are miniscule compared to those of the U.S. or Canada. Indeed, while the overall
number of films shot in Romania is small, the overall increase of production spending in Eastern
Europe as a whole increased by an astonishing 927% from 2001 to 2005.153 Cheap labor in such
nations is a given and incentives to lower labor costs are not needed. If movie production
continues to shift to such nations, the U.S., Canada and others industrialized nations ability to
compete will greatly diminish, even with generous tax incentives. The good news is that
Romania will join the European Union in 2007. As a result, labor standards, worker safety,
minimum wage laws and the introduction of the Euro as the new currency should end the burst
of film productions in Romania as living standards increase along with film production costs.
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In sum, the recent CEIDR report eschews most of the explanations for why runaway
production occurs and concludes subsidies are the “unassailable” cause:
There are obviously many factors that influence the choice of location for feature film
production. Sometimes the decision is based on artistic factors and the exchange rate and
applicable labor rates can also play a significant role. However, the connection between
the advent of Canadian Production subsidies in late 1998 and the dramatic increase in
production that occurred in the following year (as reflected by the 144% increase in dollar volume
for the 2000 release year films) appears unassailable as there were no appreciable changes in
exchange rates or labor rates to justify this dramatic shift from one year to the next, other than the
subsidy programs.154

Is Runaway Production Even an Issue?
Some commentators argue that runaway production is not a monolithic issue. In 2002,
Allen Scott155, the Director of Globalization and Policy Research at the University of California,
Los Angeles, persuasively argued against overreaction to runaway production:
So far, runaway production has not seriously undermined the vitality of the Hollywood film
industry, and it may well never become life threatening, at least in the more creative segments of
the industry. This inference is based on a presumption (a) that the towering competitive
advantages of Hollywood in pre- and post-production work will continue to prevail, and (b) that
films requiring close supervisory control and complex customized inputs at all stages of
production will continue to constitute a significant core of the industry’s product range.
Accordingly, and even though the great flow of shooting activities to Canada has unquestionably
given a developmental boost to the motion picture industries of Toronto and Vancouver where
most of the work takes place , there seems little reason to suppose that the locational attractions of
Hollywood are on the point of dissipation.156

Scott’s inferences rest on several presumptions that may have been true in 2002. In 2006,
however, the landscape has changed. The Commerce Report discusses the rise in technology and
digital transmission, which is a primary reason why “close supervision,” as Scott suggests, at “all
stages of production” are refutable presumptions. Furthermore, the rise of massive production
facilities and sound stages in Australia and elsewhere further weaken Scott’s presumption that
Hollywood will remain the epicenter for a “significant core of the industry’s product range.”
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From a historical perspective, arguing that Hollywood will not lose its power ignores the
very growth of the motion picture industry in California. Filmmakers went to California for a
host of reasons, not the least of which included: (1) leaving New Jersey (yes New Jersey) as the
primary filming location in the U.S. to avoid enforcement actions by Thomas Edison, the patent
holder on motion pictures, and (2) the availability of then-cheap land and labor. Thus,
Hollywood was, in a sense built on runaway productions. In the 1930’s, 90% of all feature films
shot in Southern California.157
History is replete with analogous examples of nations and industries that thought their
power and dominance in the world was supreme. Why is Hollywood different from Ancient
Rome, London (when the British Empire controlled one fourth of the world’s population, or
Detroit (which loses more control of the world automobile business on a daily basis)? Enron was
once a top 10 Fortune 500 company and just 10 years ago Kodak had little reason to believe that
digital cameras would decimate its bottom line. Perhaps Hollywood will remain the center of the
motion picture industry, but it is equally possible that it has its head in the sand.
The outdated thinking or lack of foresight by Scott is illustrated by his following claims:
Its (Hollywood’s) current vibrancy is all the more assured when we add to these advantages, the
benefits that it derives from its unparalleled distribution system. Accordingly, the pronouncements
to the effect that ‘Hollywood is now everywhere … production now moves almost at will to find
its most ideal conditions, and with it go skills, technicians, and support services,’ and of Hozic
(2001, p. 153) who talks about ‘Hollywood’s exodus into worldwide locations,’ are both
exaggerated and premature.158

As Epstein illustrates with the Wal-Mart example discussed earlier, the major studios would save
time and money by using technology to retire Hollywood’s “unparalleled distribution system.”
Scholarly rejection of a runaway production problem for Hollywood is well reasoned,
though, in hindsight, incorrect. Juxtaposed to such well-reasoned arguments are the words of
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former MPAA chief Jack Valenti. In April 2004, Valenti responded to a letter from
Congresswoman Diane Watson (D-CA), which was co-signed by 27 Members of the House, on
the filming of “Cinderella Man” (a story about a New York boxer during the Great Depression)
and runaway production, “or outsourcing in the entertainment industry.”159 In what the
Hollywood Reporter called a “four-page missive,” Valenti responded, “There has been no
‘outsourcing’ of U.S. motion picture jobs. Although some studio’s films are shot in whole or in
part outside the U.S., no permanent jobs have been exported.”160 The exact meaning of Valenti’s
words are open to interpretation (i.e. how does Valenti define “outsourcing,” what are
“permanent jobs” etc.), his response ignores the reality that the rate of filming outside of the U.S.
has increased dramatically in the last 10 years.161
There is a valid argument that runaway production, at some level, is healthy for the
motion picture industry in terms of free trade and competitiveness. Scott and Valenti, however,
do not make such an argument. Rather, Scott and Valenti erroneously argue that there is no
argument. They are wrong.
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Runaway Production’s Negative Effects on U.S. Production Spending
The Commerce Report provides a general overview of the economic impact runaway
productions (to foreign nations) have on the U.S.:
Even the relatively small portion of the U.S. film industry that began to move abroad in
the early 1990s had an economic impact that was not immediately obvious. Production facilities
and production-related services gradually began to lose the advantages of the economies of scale
they had enjoyed when they were operating at full capacity. Many of the specialized trades
involved in film production, particularly in the post-production phase, as well as many of the
secondary industries that depend on film production, such as equipment rental companies, require
round-the-clock, year-round demand in order to operate profitably. When sound stages in
California, New York, Illinois, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and other parts of the country
began to operate at less than full capacity, not only did the production companies experience
higher costs, but a whole host of secondary and tertiary companies hit upon hard times. The
impact was felt especially by small and medium-sized companies, many of which went out of
business as the decade wore on.162

It is ludicrous to claim that the U.S. is an effective competitor for capturing movie
productions in comparison to Canada and other countries. True, much film production is
performed in the U.S., but complacency could lead to Hollywood’s downfall. According to
CEIDR’s 2001 report, 90% of surveyed films total budgets was spent in the U.S. in 1998163. In
2001, however, that number dropped to 76%.164 Canada, on the other hand, received just 10% of
the total film budgets in 1998, but that number jumped to 24% in 2001.165 Hence, when the
Craig Report claims that Canada has not “stolen” film production from the U.S., it did benefit at
the expense of the U.S.
The most recent statistics are even more sobering. In August 2006, CEIDR released its
latest report on the impact of runaway production, which claims the worldwide geographic shift
of theatrical productions is “nothing short of astounding.”166 While the amount of money spent
on theatrical releases worldwide rose from $5.5 billion in 1998 to $7.2 billion in 2005, the share
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of that money spent on productions in the U.S. declined 14%.167 The U.S. market share of
production dollars on theatrical releases “plummeted” from 71% in 1998 to 47% in 2005.168 The
number of theatrical releases filmed in the U.S. dropped from 127 in 1998 to 99 in 2005, while
the number filmed abroad rose from 67 in 1998 to 104 in 2005.169 Even more disconcerting was
the reports following conclusion:
Using standard industry metrics of a 3.3 multiplier170 for direct expenditure and 400
jobs per $10 million in production expenditures, the decrease in U.S. production
of Theatrical Releases represents a cumulative loss to the U.S. economy of $23
billion.171

Runaway Production’s Impact on U.S. Jobs
Getting accurate statistics on motion picture employment is the most perplexing and
challenging task of data collection on runaway production. The numbers vary greatly from one
source to another and some reports have conflicting numbers collected from the same source for
the same year. Be that as it may, a survey of these numbers is essential.
Numbers reported by the MPAA reveal the imprecision of employment statistics. In
1992, the MPAA reported, 164,000 Californians were directly employed in entertainment
production.172 In 1996, the number of Californians employed in entertainment production rose to
226,000.173 In 1996, when the number of California jobs indirectly generated by the
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entertainment industry (estimated between 233,00 to 253,100) were included, the “industry’s
total employment” was “well over 450,000.”174
In addition to the 450,000 direct and indirect jobs claimed for 1996, the MPAA’s 1998
report claimed entertainment production generated $27.5 billion in economic activity in
California.175 The astonishing economic growth between 1992 and 1996, the MPAA claimed,
“exploded” for two reasons: (1) the growth of multiplex theatres, cable and a general demand for
more media and; (2) “the possibility that this new production activity would occur outside
California , or in other countries, did not materialize.”176
In 2004, the MPAA published a report that contained employment numbers for the entire
U.S., which were broken into three categories of employment: production and services, theatres
and video tape rental, and “other.”177 In 1995, the total number employed was 283,700 (135,200
in production and services P&S); in 1997, total employment was 323,000 (159,600 P&S); in
2000, total employment was 351,600 (182,800 P&S) and; in 2004, total employment was
367,900 (198,300 P&S).178 Hence, in 1997 (according to the MPAA 2004 report) total U.S.
motion picture employment of 323,000 represents a huge discrepancy from the MPAA’s claim
that the industry employed over 450,000 California worker in 1996 alone. The Commerce
Report, which also used BLS figures claimed 236,152 people were employed in motion picture
production and allied services.179
In August 2005, the Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation (LAEDC),
released a report commissioned by the California Film Commission on the economic impact of
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runaway productions. The report compared motion picture employment numbers from the
MPAA and the U.S. Census for the same year, 2002. The data from the two sources were
divided into two categories: overall motion picture employment in the U.S. and the amount of
motion picture employment in California (i.e. how much California captures of the total U.S.
figures. In 2002, the U.S. Census reported 153,000 people worked for the motion picture
industry in the entire U.S. and, of that amount, 88,500 worked in California.180 The MPAA data
for 2002 was 353,076 workers in the motion picture industry, with 245,900 of those jobs in
California.181 Due to the many confusing employment numbers reported from the above sources
over the years, the following chart is meant to provide a simplified visualization of some of the
major data:
Conflicting Data in Motion Picture Employment Sources 1992-2006
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Martha Jones used figures provided by the California Economic Development
Department (EDD). In 1992, EDD claimed 122,000 Californians worked in the motion picture
industry, and the number grew to 185,000 in 2001.182 The following chart is probably the most
accurate representation of total motion picture employment in the U.S.:
U.S. Motion Picture & Video Industries Employment 1995-August 2006
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While the employment data above appears healthy, the overall trend from 1997 to 2006 is
relatively stable; there were some slight dips and some slight gains. However, dramatic jumps in
employment over small periods of time (the 36% increase from1992 to 1996 for example) are
over.
The LAEDC also compared the payroll spending as reported by the U.S. Census and the
MPAA in 2002. The U.S. Census reported total payroll spending in the motion picture industry
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for the entire U.S. at $9.3 billion (of which $6.4 billion was spent in California).183 The MPAA
reported payroll spending at $21.2 billion for the U.S. ($17.2 billion of it spent in California).184
In 1992, according to the MPAA, the industry payroll for California was $7.4 billion.185
In 1996, industry payrolls jumped to $12 billion, an incredible 62% rise in only four years.186 In
2002, industry payrolls in California were $17.2 billion, a 43% rise over a 6-year period.187 Thus,
while payroll spending in California has seen healthy increases in recent times, the gains are not
as spectacular as they once were. So while there are still gains in employment and payroll
spending in California, the gains are slowing, a slowdown that coincides with Canada and other
countries enactment of film subsidies and tax incentives. The result of this slowdown, according
to the 2006 CEIDR report, is a cumulative loss of $23 billion to the U.S. economy from 1998 to
2005 and 47,000 U.S. jobs lost for each of those years or 329,000 lost jobs in seven years.188
The assertions in the 2006 CEIDR report, while probably accurate, are misleading. As the BLS
figures in the chart above indicate, the U.S. motion picture industry is not “losing jobs” per se.
Rather, a more accurate assertion is that the U.S. is not adding new jobs that would otherwise
exist domestically but for the tax incentives pioneered by Canada and now being duplicated by
numerous countries. The great loss for the U.S. economy was and is the failure to capture
production spending and job creation that could help stimulate the domestic economy and
allowing U.S. supremacy over the motion picture industry to be chipped away at.
If the job losses reported by the Monitor Report and CEIDR are accurate, film
employment in Canada would rise. It did. Employment data collected from Canadian sources
183
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show a dramatic increase from 1994 to 2003. In 1994, 24,100 Canadian workers were involved
in direct film and television production and 38,000 workers were indirectly employed.189 In
2002, those numbers jumped to 51,300 and 82,100 respectively.190 Film and television location
spending in Canada was $1.96 billion in 1999, an increase of 34% from 1998, and an almost
five-fold increase since 1996.191 In 1994, by comparison, foreign location spending in Canada
was just $318 million.192
In 2004, foreign film and television production in Canada was $1.9 billion and the
number of jobs was 52,000 (20,000 direct and 32,000 indirect).193 In 2005, however, those
numbers plummeted to 38,900 (15,000 direct and 23,900 indirect).194 The following chart
illustrates the dramatic increase in motion picture employment after the first Canadian tax
incentives took effect in 1998:
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Canadian Employment From Foreign Location Production 1997-2005
60,000
52,100
50,000

53,500

52,000

45,700
38,900

40,000
30,000

50,400

33,600
23,900

25,500

1997

1998

20,000
10,000
0
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

In 2005, the Canadian film and television industry was facing an uncertain future:
Let’s not forget about Canada’s filmmakers. While film represents a smaller portion of the
production pie, it has been hit hardest. Foreign-location production, which accounts for 33% of
total production activity, dropped by 23% to $1.46 billion. While both Ontario and Quebec
bounced back from a decline in the previous year, a severe downturn in British Columbia erased
their gains. Once again, the oscillation in the volume of activity illustrates the uncertainty of
depending on offshore sources as an industrial base.195

Furthermore, if television production is removed from the equation, the actual amount of foreign
location spending on feature films alone was $789 million in 2005, compared to $1.16 billion in
2004.196 Lastly, it must be acknowledged that U.S. films accounted for 86.7% of the Canadian
box office.197 The Department of Canadian Heritage attributes the decline in foreign location
spending and employment on the rise of the Canadian Dollar and the “proliferation of tax
incentives outside Canada.”198
Since motion picture employment in Canada, while high, has not experienced a gain of
employment on par with U.S. job losses. U.S. job losses cannot be attributed to Canada alone.
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Other nations like Romania, Great Britain, New Zealand, Morocco, South Africa etc, must also
contribute to U.S. jobs losses. With the exception of Australia, employment data for other
nations is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, as Canada predicted, other jurisdictions, like
Australia, have enacted tax incentives for the motion picture industry. Australia passed its first
film incentives in 2002 and major motion pictures such as The Matrix, Star Wars Episode II and
Episode III, and Superman Returns, all box-office hits filmed there.199
The following chart illustrates the large number of new film employment:
Austrailian Film Production: Paid & Unpaid Employment 1997-2004
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(Source: Australian Film Commission, Get the Picture 12, May 9, 2005, available at
http://www.afc.gov.au/gtp/pdfs/employment.pdf. The report provides not explanation on why there are such large numbers of
unpaid workers.)

Clearly, there are problems with the employment numbers in the motion picture industry.
How many people are employed by the motion picture industry, given the confusion between
direct and indirect employment and the use of multipliers? Based on the information above, it’s
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safe to assume that roughly 400,000 people in the U.S. make their living in the motion picture
industry.200
In sum, the U.S. is rapidly losing its position as the filming location for so-called U.S.
films. The exodus of U.S. films to foreign nations increased rapidly in the last 10 years. Since
American consumers are not benefiting from the alleged cost savings of shooting abroad, why
should the U.S. allow a profitable industry that employs hundreds of thousands of well
compensated workers to migrate to other nations? Globalization is not needed to maintain U.S.
competitiveness in the movie industry because there is no threat of foreign competition. To keep
Hollywood in Hollywood, so to speak, state and federal law makers must move quickly to enact
legislation that provides studios the incentive to stay in the U.S.
Runaway Production’s Negative Cultural Impact on U.S. Films
Movies are perhaps the most significant cultural production that the United States has, for
better or worse, produced and offered to the world. Though many people feel that there are too
many “bad movies,” movies are a form of art. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court said, “it
cannot be doubted” that motion pictures posses elements that “characterizes all artistic
expression”:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas.
They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of
a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic
expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the
fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.201
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James Mangold, who wrote and directed 2005’s highly acclaimed film “Walk the Line,”
a movie about Johnny Cash, claims that runaway production causes filmmakers to “lose the
ability to capture part of our own culture”:
One of the things that’s getting very lost in the business of movies, where people go, you know,
very often to Canada to shoot films to save money is that we lose the ability to capture part of our
own culture. And this film, Kathy Conrad (producer) and I are really proud that we shot this film
in the places that it happened, mainly in Memphis, Tennessee, Nashville and its surroundings.
And you get more than just the scenery when you do that…you get a lot more. You get the people.
You get the people working on the film that are from the area. And, in this case you also get
people that love Johnny Cash who work their heads off. In every scene we did, in every concert
scene we did, the extras were so passionate. You cant imagine what a trying experience it is to be
an extra in one of these scenes and how long your waiting in a hot room waiting to play the song
again and again and again to be shot from a new angle and these people gave their all and the
actors on stage really felt that excitement from the crowd….These people really came to be part of
this movie and part of a man’s life that they really respected and loved and you can feel that
energy in the scene.202

This same sentiment is echoed by director and producer Ivan Reitman who extolled the
benefits of filming on location in New York City for 1984’s blockbuster “Ghostbusters”:
Ghostbusters was the first movie I shot in New York. And people were telling me how rough it
was to shoot there, but I actually fell in love with the experience because—it’s a cliché—but the
whole place is like an extraordinary set and the people, the extras, give you so much more than
you would get anywhere else.203

Thus, when audiences watch “Ghostbusters,” they see actual (not stand-in) locations such as
Columbia University, New York City Hall and Central Park’s Tavern on the Green.
Other quintessentially American films made abroad include the aforementioned
“Cinderella Man,” “Capote,” “The Day After Tomorrow,” “New York Minute,” and “Wicker
Park.” And these films barely begin to scratch the surface.
Clearly, studios can save money on labor in other nations. In Canada, the labor savings
stem from government tax breaks and incentives. In Romania, labor is cheap because it is
essentially third-world slave labor. Despite these savings, Jack Green, the acclaimed
cinematographer who received an Academy Award nomination for 1992’s “Unforgiven,” claims
202
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that filmmakers are leaving the U.S. unnecessarily.204 First, Green says, you get what you pay
for; American movie crews cost more because they know how to do things faster and better.
Second, Green thinks filming abroad is unethical. For example, Green declined to work for
“Miracle,” a film about the 1980 U.S. Olympic hockey team that shocked the world by defeating
the Soviet Union’s vaunted team. Green said, “Here was a film about the American Dream, and
they were shooting it in Canada. It just really disturbs me.”205
Former President Ronald Reagan credits the start of his political career to the speeches he
made as president of SAG, in which he “tried to emphasize how important the movies were to
American culture.”206 Reagan claimed his ties to Hollywood during World War II helped
General Hap Arnold in creating an independent air force (which was still part of the army at that
time).207 Reagan was tasked with making air force training videos and documentaries. Because
of the movie industry and his ties to it, Reagan recruited technicians and artists from the industry
who were not eligible for combat.208 Finally, Reagan credits Hollywood (its technology, camera
operators, technicians etc.) with capturing and preserving film footage taken at Germany’s
concentration camps.209
Expanding on Reagan’s point that movies are an important part of American culture is
the idea that American movies helped affect world culture in positive ways.
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Meryl Marshall, a former member of the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, wrote on the
values that American movies exported to the rest of the world:
America exported stories defining a system of government that could withstand open
criticism and still grow stronger (Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, Gentleman’s Agreement);
stories demonstrating that talent and hard work could surpass birth into a social class as
determinants of wealth or fame (Rocky); stories about one person’s ability to make a difference
(Norma Rae), and to overcome persecution and prejudice (To Kill a Mocking Bird); stories
exploring the impact of American slavery and prejudice and the struggle to transform society into
one of equal rights for all (Roots). Many of these American films and television programs have
helped promote freedom and democratic values, the same values that encouraged throngs of
people throughout the world to rise up and challenge repressive governments, contributing to the
end of the Cold War, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and the events in Tiananmen Square
before the crackdown.210
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III. Major Players in Runaway Production Debate
The Runaway Production Players
The primary beneficiaries of runaway production are the major studios seeking to reduce
costs. To say studios “like” or “dislike” runaway productions misses the point—they like the
cost savings offered abroad. If it were cheaper to film in the United States, the studios would
make movies here. Filmmaking is a very expensive undertaking that involves high risk.
Because of market uncertainties, decisions on who to cast, what genre to film, and where
to film are all based on the bottom line. Time-Warner, for example, a publicly traded company,
has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to increase shareholder value. If the company
can save 30% on production costs by shooting a big budget film in Vancouver instead of Los
Angeles, Time-Warner has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to do so. 20th Century Fox
executive vp Fred Baron, speaking at an industry panel on runaway production, claimed, “What
we’re trying to do right now is fighting to keep film in America. But in our process, we are
forced to go offshore because of prices” Baron cited “Fantastic Four” and X-Men 3” as
examples of movies too expensive to film in the U.S.211 If a big budget film flops, then a savings
of 30% on production could save the company from insolvency. In short, there is no “bad guy”
in the runaway production battle. It is quite possible that the executive who decides to shoot a
film abroad would prefer to keep the production in the United States.
There are many groups and organizations in the U.S. opposed to runaway production.
Leading the charge to curb, if not end, runaway production, are a variety of labor unions, actors
and politicians at all levels of government. Opponents to runaway production in the U.S.,
however, are not a unified front and there is constant bickering between various factions.
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The Directors Guild of America and the Motion Picture Association Approach
The Directors Guild of America (DGA) claims a membership of 12,700.212 The
importance of the DGA stems from the guild’s Basic Agreement with the major Hollywood
studios, virtually all of which are signatories to the agreement (the list of signatories is extensive
and includes such major studios as 20th Century Fox, Paramount, Universal, Dreamworks,
TriStar, and United Artists). Per the DGA agreement, directors who are not members of the
guild cannot direct films for the major studios.213
Not surprisingly, the DGA’s most important supporters are the major studios represented
by the MPAA. The MPAA was established in 1922 “as the trade association of the American
film industry.”214 Today, the MPAA represents the world’s major media conglomerates--Disney,
Sony, 20th Century Fox, Paramount, Universal, Warner Brothers and MGM.215
The strategy that the DGA and MPAA employs to combat runaway production is the
“subsidy to fight subsidy” approach, which involves lobbying for the establishment of state and
local tax incentives, similar to those in Canada and elsewhere.
The Film and Television Action Committee Approach
At odds with the DGA and MPAA is the Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC).
FTAC was formed in 1998 with the sole purpose of “recovering American film jobs.”216 FTAC
claims it’s “supported and endorsed” by a variety of entities, including SAG. According to their
website, the rest of the FTAC coalition includes:
FTAC is supported and endorsed by these unions: IATSE Locals 695, 871, 44, 728, 720, Laborers
International Union of North America (LIUNA), Studio Utility Employees Local 724 (LIUNA),
International Brotherhood of Teamsters International, and Local’s 399, 355, 391, 509, 592, IBEW
Local 40, Plasterers Local 755, UA Plumbers Local 78. In addition, the Florida Motion Picture
212
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and Television Association, the cities of Burbank and Santa Monica CA, Pittsburgh PA, Jersey
City and Clifton NJ, Hollywood Center Studios, Michaelsons Catering, Fantasy II Film Effects,
International Studio Services, History for Hire, Jackson Shrub Supply.217

FTAC believes the subsidies employed by foreign nations, specifically Canada, are
illegal under international trade agreements. In short, FTAC plans to file a petition with the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR), whose office would conduct an investigation of foreign
(specifically Canadian) subsidies. Obviously, FTAC hopes the USTR would confirm that foreign
subsidies do violate trade agreements and negotiate for their elimination. If trade negotiations
failed, the WTO could intervene to settle the dispute.
FTAC faces major obstacles by filing a complaint with the U.S. Trade Representative.
First, the government has total discretion in deciding whether or not it pursues a trade dispute
with any member of the WTO.218 Given the minimal trade disputes the U.S. files with the WTO,
FTAC bears a level of persuasion of astonishing levels to overcome U.S. apathy in this area.219
Second, it’s hard to accuse other nations of violating trade agreements since many states (and
now the Federal Government at a minimal level) have film incentives of their own. This
argument carries weight given the current political climate of states rights and national
sovereignty espoused by the Republican-controlled government. Moreover, FTAC’s complaint,
which has yet to be filed, targets Canada specifically—not other countries.
The DGA and the MPAA argue that FTAC’s plan would result in a trade war with
Canada and other countries, which might cause foreign nations to block the importation of U.S.
films. Such a trade war, the DGA and MPAA argue, would cause even more job loss in the
United States.
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Although the DGA/MPAA preference for subsidies may be the more effective means of
preserving U.S. jobs, their attack on the FTAC plan may be disingenuous and over exaggerated.
In the era of globalization and free trade, it’s highly unlikely that a trade war of such magnitude
would cause foreign governments to block the importation of U.S. films. Blocking the
importation of a U.S. film ignores the reality that, thanks in part to runaway production and
globalization, it become increasingly difficult to define a “U.S. film.” Entertainment Attorney
and producer Mark Litwak explained the dilemma of defining “U.S. films”:
It can be difficult to characterize films according to nationality in an age of multinational
corporations and producers with dual citizenship. For example, the Harry Potter movies are based
on a book by an English author and shot in the United Kingdom with a British cast. Even so, they
are produced by a U.S.-based studio and, therefore, considered to be U.S. films. Twentieth
Century Fox is considered to be a U.S. company, but it is controlled by Rupert Murdoch, an
Australian.220

Since the MPAA represents media companies that want to increase profits and lower
production costs, they, by corporate design have a self-interest in pursuing the “subsidies to fight
subsidies” approach. But the MPAA approach has an inherent flaw: as city, state and national
governments pass more incentives to lure film production, it could create a “race to the bottom”
phenomenon that primarily, if not exclusively, benefits the industry itself.
The Achilles heel facing FTAC is the presumed legality of Canadian subsidies. In 2001,
Stephen Katz, of the CEIDR, reported the following:
There appears to be no legislative prohibition against Canadian production subsidies. The U.S.
Office of Management and Budget classifies the production of motion pictures and television as a
Service Industry. We have been advised that, as such, there are no protections from a trading
partner who chooses to subsidize an Economic Sector such as the film and television production
industry under the current General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). If the production of
motion pictures and television, however, were classified as a Manufacturing Industry, the
Canadian subsidies would fall under the dispute settlement provisions of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).221
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While FTAC’s claims of unfair trade may have merit222, the consensus is that the
Canadian subsidies would be upheld. Finally, it appears that many of the labor unions, including
SAG, have implicitly abandoned the FTAC approach. The 2005 CEIDR report received funding
from SAG and other unions that ostensibly support the FTAC. CEIDR’s 2005 report, however,
downplays the FTAC approach as “well intentioned,” but rife with potential problems:
There are groups and individuals that are challenging the legality of foreign production
subsidies by seeking a Section 301 filing126 with the United States Trade Representative.
While well-intentioned, many believe this approach could present unintended
consequences and difficulties for the U.S. production industry.223

Finally, even if the U.S. Trade Representative chooses to pursue FTAC’s forthcoming
filing and the WTO rules in favor of the U.S., Canada can appeal the ruling and keep the issue
from complete resolution for years. And as a last resort, Canada can simply choose to ignore
such a ruling.224
The Screen Actors Guild’s Stance
As aforementioned, SAG’s outspoken resistance to runaway production dates back to the
1950s. SAG is a large force in Hollywood with a membership that exceeds 100,000. SAG is an
affiliate of the AFL-CIO with a long history of improving working conditions for actors. A
major limitation (arguably a benefit) on SAG members is they cannot work on non-union
productions. Despite the abhorrence of organized labor by many large companies (Wal-Mart
comes to mind225) and the vilification of labor unions by the Republican Party, it is worth noting
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that two past presidents of SAG—former President Ronald Reagan and Charlton Heston—are
icons in the Republican Party. There may be a popular perception that SAG is populated by
highly paid, high profile members—elite liberal actors from Hollywood. The reality is that 70%
of it members received less than $7,500 in 2001.226
Given the stature of some of its past leadership and its entrenched position in the
entertainment industry, SAG has shown signs of weakness. In 2000, for example, SAG staged a
strike because major movie studios and cable companies refused to pay actors residual payments
from pay-for-play movies. SAG considered the strike a success. The strike saved the pay-forplay residuals and also increased the amount of residual payments from cable television.
Notwithstanding the consensus among SAG that the strike was a success, the strike was
financially damaging to the members who did not work during the six-month strike. SAG
reported that its members lost over $100 million in income during the strike.227 And while SAG
members abhor runaway production, the union’s leadership may fail to acknowledge that such
strikes may increase the incentive for movie studios and advertisers to establish and grow
international production centers to compensate for any future strikes that grind production to a
halt. The suggestion that labor union strikes would increase runaway production is, however,
speculative.
For the past several years, the political infighting of SAG’s leadership has raised
questions as to whether the guild’s loyalty lies with its membership or with the major studios.
The first-order economic analysis of minimum wage laws shows that they reduce employment by
raising the price of labor; the Law of Demand teaches that an increase in the price of a good
reduces the quantity of it that is demanded. A second-order analysis complicates the picture. Price
affects supply as well as demand. An increase in the price of labor might attract into the labor
force individuals who, at the existing price, prefer to go to school, engage in crime, work part time,
or subsist on welfare.
For the complete exchange see “The Posner-Becker Blog,” available at http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2006/07/
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Specifically, SAG’s internal leadership struggles have led it to flip-flop on the two conflicting
legislative methods pursued by the FTAC and the DGA/MPAA.
In 2001, SAG’s board of directors named Bob Pisano as its National Executive Director.
Pisano, an entertainment attorney, came to SAG with 30 years of experience in the entertainment
industry, having served as a senior executive at Paramount Pictures and MGM. Pisano’s prior
positions with Paramount and MGM presented a conflict of interest. How could a former senior
executive of the motion picture industry, which would prefer the non-existence of labor unions,
effectively represent SAG? Who was Pisano loyal to?
According to FTAC member Gene Warren, winner of the Academy Award for Best
Visual Effects for “Terminator 2” and owner of Fantasy II Film Effects, SAG’s leadership has
two factions: one supporting FTAC and one in favor appeasing the MPAA.228 SAG’s general
membership, Warren claims, overwhelmingly supports FTAC.229 Warren took issue with
Pisano’s appointment to SAG and Pisano’s instance that his title was that of CEO, not National
Executive Director.230 The decision to hire Pisano as SAG’s “CEO,” was, according to Warren,
an effort by the MPAA, and those in SAG’s leadership opposed to FTAC, to destroy opposition
to runaway production amongst members whose views paralleled those of FTAC.231
Warren’s comments on Pisano are not baseless. Pisano opposed SAG’s general support
of the FTAC. In October 2005, (after Pisano’s tenure at SAG ended) SAG’s national board
voted unanimously to support FTAC and its approach to end runaway production.232 Moreover,
worries that Pisano’s position at SAG represented a conflict of interest were realized in 2005,
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when the MPAA named Pisano president and, unsurprisingly, CEO for Los Angeles
operations.233
Evidence of SAG’s factional leadership continues. SAG contributed $10,000 of the
$50,000 needed to produce the 2005 CEIDR report, which calls the FTAC approach “well
intentioned” but rife with problems.234 According to Warren, “it’s all politics.”235 Stephen Katz,
author of the 2005 CEIDR Report, claims SAG’s internal politics did not influence the report,
which generally supports subsidizes in some fashion.236
Katz shares FTAC’s concerns and agrees that runaway production must end. The
difference between the two is how to end runaway production. Katz, for example, points to the
numerous U.S. state level incentives, which may be as culpable for runaway productions from
California as Canada’s subsidies.237 As subsidies for the motion picture industry proliferate,
declaring a subset of them (here Canada’s) may not be practical.
Others Who Fight Runaway Production: Saints or Selfish?
There is anecdotal evidence that a major motion picture having the “look and feel” of a
$100 million budget can film in the U.S. for only $39 million. This was the case with
Universal’s 2005 film “Serenity.” Executives at Universal liked the pitch for “Serenity,” and
they loved Joss Whedon, the creator, writer, and director (Whedon’s popularity stemmed from
writing and directing the television series “Buffy the Vampire Slayer” and “Angel”). Universal
Executives estimated that “Serenity” would require a $100 million budget, which was “just too
much” for a film with no name recognition.238 Whedon promised Universal that he could shoot
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the film half the $100 million estimate.239 Whedon became a hero in the eyes of the FTAC,
which hailed “Serenity” as a model of efficiency that did not require running away to Canada or
Romania.
According to one Universal executive, Whedon was “so eager to show that you make a
movie in L.A., we never thought of going anywhere else.”240 Whedon’s decision to film in Los
Angeles, however, did not stem from altruism. Whedon said his “reasons were completely
personal.”241 Whedon’s wife is an architect in Los Angeles and he has two young children that
he did not want to “uproot.” Labeling Whedon as a champion of keeping jobs in America may
be premature as his next project, a big screen version of “Wonder Woman,” is scheduled to film
in Australia.242
Similarly, U.S. labor unions should think twice about praising Jodie Foster, the star of
2005’s “Flightplan.” The movie was scheduled to be filmed abroad until Foster refused to leave
Los Angeles. The specifics of Foster’s salary are unknown, but she said her contract “made it
worth their while” to keep the film in Los Angeles.243
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger refused to join the cast of “Terminator 3”
unless production was moved from Vancouver to California. Arnold’s solidarity with the U.S.
worker, however, is disingenuous. Politics, not altruism, seems to have been Schwarzenegger’s
motivation; when he demanded the film to shoot in California, he was preparing to run for
Governor.244 “Terminator 3” had a budget around $170 million and Schwarzenegger patted
himself on the back for taking an $8 million pay cut to get production moved to California.245
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The pay cut, however, is not praiseworthy when details of his contract are examined. Among the
goodies in the 33-page contract was a “pay or play” fee of $29 million, meaning Arnold would
get paid even if the film was never made, and a per package of $1.5 million for personal
bodyguards, use of a private jet, a fully equipped gym trailer, and 24-hour limousine service.246
Further, Arnold’s “film in California” rhetoric is hypocrisy; many of his past films shot in
Canada and Mexico. And despite his promises to fight runaway production from California, the
state’s budgetary problems have precluded the legislature from passing tax breaks.
To be sure, there are some in the film industry that refuse to film overseas (Clint
Eastwood, Harold Ramis, M. Night Shayamalan and Spike Lee are all good examples), but an
overall sampling of productions that relocated from abroad to the U.S. reveals the motive was
personal, not social.

IV. Applying Law & Economics To Runaway Productions, Poverty, and
Globalization
Social Costs: Runaway Production in Third World Nations
As aforementioned, Romania is fast becoming a primary filming location for the major
studios. Although Romanian workers are eager to work on movies, the working conditions in
Romania begin to highlight the darker side of runaway production not present in Canada or
Australia. Union workers in the U.S. often guarantee overtime wages after eight hours in a day.
In Romania, however, workers typically do not collect overtime wages until they work 72 hours
in a week.247 Furthermore, according to Los Angeles Times reporter John Horn, the “work
environment encountered overseas is often unsafe and unregulated,” an advantage that “studio
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executives are loathe to say aloud.”248 In Romania, there are few, if any, unions or watchdog
groups to enforce safer working conditions.249 Perhaps the saddest comment on the welfare of
Romanian film crews is that livestock used in a recent film cost more than local actors.250
There is an argument that runaway productions enable studios to make “good” movies
when they otherwise would not be able to. Evidence for this argument is weak (and needs
further study), but it does exist.251 In 2003, “Cold Mountain,” a movie about the American Civil
War was the “first major mainstream American movie” to be shot in Romania.252 The story of
“Cold Mountain” is set in North Carolina. Albert Berger, the film’s producer, claimed, “Without
the savings that Romania offered, ‘Cold Mountain’ absolutely would not have gotten made.”253
“Cold Mountain” received numerous Academy Award nominations and Actress Renee
Zellweger won an Oscar for best supporting actress.
By contrast, runaway production also leads to the creation of what many would consider
“bad” films. An interesting example of this involves a film whose producers wanted to film in
New Mexico. Producers of the 2006 movie “The Hills Have Eyes” filmed in Morocco because
New Mexico was too expensive and “religious Saudis” owned the land they wanted to use and
thus demanded to read and censor the script.254 Morocco’s Islamic government, because it wants
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to lure the film industry, does not “tamper with film content.”255 And coming in 2007, “The
Hills Have Eyes II,” filming in Morocco, of course.
On the other hand, Morocco was able to lure Academy Award winning Director Oliver
Stone to film much of 2004’s “Alexander” there.256 Despite several suicide bombings in
Morocco in 2003, Stone insisted on using Morocco as the backdrop for his story, then the most
expensive independent movie shot outside the U.S.257 The makers of “Alexander” knew the
benefits of Morocco’s “main attraction,” the movie extras working for $1.80 an hour.258 Without
such savings, “Alexander” would have cost much more to make, if at all.
And despite “increasing evidence of Islamic Fundamentalism” in Morocco, Director Sir
Ridley Scott elected to shoot scenes for “Kingdom of Heaven,” which for some Muslims was a
religiously sensitive film about the Crusades.259 Security for the film was tightened after rumors
surfaced that one scene featured a crusader “stamping on the Koran.”260 Finally, Islamic
fundamentalism, ironically, was embraced by the makers of Universal’s “United 93,” which
captured the horror of 9/11. According to “United 93” Director Paul Greengrass, an alternate
opening of the film was shot in Morocco (standing in for Afghanistan) depicting the meeting
between the 9/11 hijackers and Osama bin Laden.261
The Romanian and Moroccan examples provides weight that runaway productions can be
good for the studios because they cost less and are capable of reaching high levels of artistic
quality, if they want to. On the other hand, runaway production has the ability to exploit foreign
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labor and expose workers--human beings--to unsafe working conditions that do not seem to
offset cost savings to the production. Economics aside, is all this a good thing?
To this writer, there is something inherently wrong when a movie about the U.S. Civil
War films in Romania. There is something wrong when Superman, a tale of a superhero born
and raised in Kansas that stands for “truth justice and the American way,” films in Australia.
Most Americans are completely unaware of this deceptive filmmaking. Would learning the truth
about where studios make films outrage Americans? Maybe not. In another context, if the
millions of Americans who grace their cars with yellow ribbon magnets reading “support our
troops” learned that the magnet was made in China262, it would probably make them mad, to say
the least. Purchasing the magnet from Wal-Mart supports Chinese workers (and perhaps their
troops) more than it does ours.
At some point, students of law and economics have to separate themselves from the
efficiency and benefits that Hollywood and other multinational corporations receive from
runaway productions or offshoring. At some point, students have to ask, “is this ethical?”
Judge Posner on Globalization and Free Trade
Should the United States take protectionist measures against what Posner calls “allegedly
‘unfair’ trade practices?” According to Posner, “in general the answer is no, if the maximand is
taken to be world economic welfare as a whole.”263 Posner concedes, however, that if the
maximand “is the protecting the nation’s welfare, then protectionism may occasionally be
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justified.”264 Any discussion of free trade and globalization is sorely lacking in Posner’s work
and he fails to define “world economic welfare as a whole.”
Posner’s concession that protectionism may be justified in certain cases seems to imply
that globalization and free trade pose social and economic problems. Indeed, there are problems
with globalization. On his web blog, Posner recently delved into the global labor market with
the following observations on how corporations act “draconian” when they seek to avoid
government standards (in this case minimum wage laws):
One especially draconian way of doing this is by relocating the firm's plants or other facilities
from the jurisdiction imposing the high minimum wage to a jurisdiction that has a lower minimum
wage. Becker points out that this may be a consequence of the Chicago ordinance because it does
not reach Chicago's suburbs. It is a reason for believing that state minimum wages are likely to
have fewer disemployment effects that local minimum wages, and the federal minimum wage
fewer disemployment effects than state minimum wages.265

In 2006, The Economist published a 19-page “special report on the world economy.”266
According to the report, so-called “rich countries” (i.e. G10 countries) are democracies “so
continued support for globalization will depend on how prosperous the average worker feels.”267
The average G10 country worker’s “share of the cake” (in terms of wages as a percentage of
national income), however, is “the smallest it has been for at least three decades.”268 Corporate
America, on the other hand, almost doubled its share of national income from 7% in 2001 to
13% in 2006.269 In sum, globalization has redistributed income by lifting corporate profits
relative to wages.
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Critics of globalization in rich countries fear the loss of jobs to low-cost foreign
competitors, but the “real threat” is to wages, not jobs.270 It’s commonly asserted that, free trade
and offshoring should not effect total employment in rich countries; rather trade with emerging
economies “can have a big impact on both average and relative wages.”271 According to The
Economist, real wages, over a long period of time, tend to track average productivity growth but
so far this have decade, workers real pay in developed economies increased more slowly than
labor productivity.272 For example, the real weakly wage of “a typical American worker fell
4%” since 2001 while their productivity rose by 15% over the same period.273 Thus, according
to The Economist:
[T]he usual argument in favor of globalization—that it will make most workers better off, with
only a few low-skilled ones losing out—has not so far been borne out by the facts. Most workers
are being squeezed.274

Over time, the report claims, worldwide competition should:
[R]educe profit margins and distribute benefits back to consumers and workers in the form of
lower prices. But downward pressure on wages in rich countries could continue for a long time.275

Countering the fears of outsourcing are statistics, thus far less than 1 million American servicesector jobs have been lost to offshoring.276 Forrester Research forecasts that by 2015 a total 3.4
million service-sector jobs will move abroad, a tiny number, The Economist claims, compared to
the 30 million jobs “destroyed and created in America every year.”277 Princeton University
economist Alan Blinder, however, thinks many economists, including those at Forrester

270

Id.
Id.
272
A Survey of the World Economy, THE ECONOMIST, September 16, 2006.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id. Citing Forrester Research reports.
271

69

Research, underestimate the damaging effects of offshoring and implies that at least 30% of all
jobs might be at risk.278
It could be argued that opponents of runaway production were overreacting to films that
went to Canada and other industrialized nations. Globalization, free trade and offshoring
adherents thus prevailed in opening Hollywood’s floodgates. That said, if runaway production
starts shifting to locations like Romania, Morocco, Bulgaria, and one day even China,
globalization cheerleaders will be ignoring the human costs in favor of the economic savings. As
Reagan said, free trade should also be fair trade.
Perhaps union militancy exasperated runaway production and union leaders should have
made reasonable concessions and loosen strict demands in their contracts. Moreover, lawmakers
in California and across the United States at the state and federal level failed to recognize the
resurgence of runaway production. Lawmakers should be proactive in enacting any legislation to
address a foreseeable problem, especially when a vital U.S. industry is at stake. Unfortunately,
as is usually the case, most U.S. legislation is reactive rather than proactive.
Judge Posner on Inequality in the United States
If, as Posner says, the goal of free trade is to improve world “economic welfare as a
whole,” globalization needs to make some improvements. Posner admits that income in the
United States is unevenly distributed.279 Since Posner’s recent edition of “Economic Analysis of
the Law” was published in 2003, it’s questionable why he uses data from 1986 to measure
income inequality.280 Recent, more pertinent, data on inequality is available. In 1986, the
poorest 20% of U.S. households had no more than 4 or 5% of the nation’s personal income and
278
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the richest 20% had about 47%.281 Even in 1986, the United States had the most unequal
distribution of income among the wealthy nations of the world.282 Posner’s position on income
inequality is ambiguous. In any event, income inequality has increased dramatically. In 1997,
the richest 1% of Americans controlled 40.1% of the nation’s wealth.283 The 1997 figures were
measured by the Gini Index, which is a “comprehensive standard of inequality.”284 In 1979, the
richest one 1% of Americans controlled 20.5% of the nation’s wealth.285
While the income studies Posner cites may differ from the Gini Index’s conclusions, they
both agree that disparities in wealth shrink precipitously after 1945 and have risen since the
1980’s. The period between 1945 and the 1980’s saw a host of social, federal and state
initiatives that diminished economic inequality. Labor union membership hit their peak in the
mid 1950’s, when the unionized portion of the work force was 32.5%.286 By 1975, union
membership dropped to just 14.1% of the workforce, a level not seen since the period before the
Great Depression. Unions helped increase wages and improve working conditions. The G.I. Bill
sent millions of servicemen to college after Word War II. New Deal programs helped build the
nation’s infrastructure. Former President Lyndon Baines Johnson waged his war on poverty and
African Americans received the right to vote. Social Security was established, minimum wage
was set at the federal level, Medicare and Medicaid were established and the list goes on. Posner
ignores these factors.
It is quite possible that the establishment of the laws and regulations correlated with the
reduction of inequality. Does Posner fail to address these issues because he opposes them on
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political or economic grounds? Does Posner omit a discussion because others (and Perhaps
Posner himself) have found that laws and regulations (or entitlements as some prefer to label
them) listed above were the major forces that reduced inequality? Students of law and
economics can only guess.
Posner implies that the solution to economic inequality in the United States is a transfer
of wealth from the rich to the poor, which would involve high transaction costs. Again, Posner
hurries his discussion of what he assumes will be redistribution of wealth. He makes wealth
redistribution sound like Robin Hood. Why does wealth need redistributed? Is redistribution the
only solution to reducing inequality? Is wealth a limited resource? The nature of investments is
to grow wealth into more wealth; the Dow Jones has no cap. Thus, we could reduce inequality
without redistributing what people own. Rather, we could implement policies to increase future
wealth of the poor.287 It is ironic that those in favor of free trade flout Posner’s concerns about
wealth redistribution and its transaction costs. Many free traders claim it’s beneficial because it
raises living standards across the world and more fairly redistributes wealth.
Posner also claims that since people’s marginal utility curves are “probably unknowable,”
there is a “plausible assumption” that marginal utility curves are the same across income groups.
Given this assumption (which Posner may or may not agree with), equalizing incomes would
“probably increase utility.” Conversely, Posner asks the following:
Yet mightn’t income and the marginal utility thereof be, within limits anyway, positively
correlated—on the theory that the people who work hard to make money and succeed in making it
are, on average, those who value money the most, having given up other things such as leisure to
get it?288

Posner’s so-called theory above (which he may not agree with) does a disservice to the millions
of Americans working hard to earn a living. The working poor of this nation work hard for their
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income and give up leisure time to earn it. Suggesting that they do not value money because they
may not “succeed in making it” is insulting. It’s a myth that anyone can work hard, make money,
and be successful. It happens, but not very often.
Posner on Inequality and Crime in “Poor Countries”
Posner also discusses the impact of income inequalities on crime. Again, Posner’s
position is ambiguous:
The opportunity costs of crime could be increases, and thus the incidence of crime reduced , by
reducing unemployment, which would increase the gains from lawful work. The benefits of theft,
and hence its incidence, might be reduced by a redistribution of wealth away from the wealthy.
However, redistributing wealth might increase the incidence of theft, because the costs of
protecting wealth may be smaller per unit of wealth, if wealth is concentrated, and also because it
is easier to fence goods in common use and they are more widely possessed in an egalitarian
society, and because a welfare system reduces the opportunity costs of crime by taxing legitimate
income heavily…289

Whatever Posner is trying to say about crime and inequality becomes more clear almost 200
pages later in his book. Posner claims:
It is true that crime rates frequently are low in poor countries, even though inequality of wealth is
often much greater in those countries than in wealthier ones…It is where wealth is more widely
distributed that criminals are presented with an abundance of attractive targets.290

Author Eduardo Galeano documents case after case on the effects of poverty. Galeano
would argue with Posner’s assertion that “crime rates frequently are lower in poor countries.” In
Africa, for instance, children are recruited by force and make up half the victims of recent
African wars.291 Latin America, Galeano claims, is a “slave economy masquerading as
postmodern: it pays African wages, it charges European prices, and the merchandise it produces
most efficiently is injustice and violence.”292 Statistics from Mexico City from 1997, show 80%
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of the population poor, 3% rich, and “the rest in the middle.”293 Every year, according to
Galeano, poverty kills more people than the entire Second World War.294 In 1997, the murder
rate in Latin America was six times the world average.295 How trustworthy are crime statistics
from Brazil when “the majority” of Rio de Janeiro’s police force admitted to taking bribes in
1996?296
In 1997, there were 1.8 million prisoners in U.S. jails, which is twice the number of
prisoners in 1986.297 If, as Posner admits, economic inequality has grown (now to pre Great
Depression levels) why are there so many prisoners? Under Posner’s hypothesis, shouldn’t the
number of prisoners shrink as wealth becomes more concentrated? In the U.S. alone, personal
debt is at record levels and real wages have remained stagnant. Galeano suggests that perhaps
it’s anxiety people feel about buying “and the anguish of paying,” that explains why the U.S.
population consumes half the “sleeping pills, tranquilizers, and other legal drugs sold in world,
as well as half the illegal drugs.”298 If these numbers are accurate, they are deeply troubling for a
nation that makes up only 5% of the world’s population.
Most people, Posner notes, are risk averse. Why then, should people in the U.S. place
trust in a global economy that may or may not be raising living standards around the world?
Jobs in the movie industry (SAG members aside) are generally high wage, highly unionized, and
usually provide good benefits like health insurance. There is a case for keeping film jobs in the
U.S. not only because of the gross inequality in other nations such jobs might go to, but for the
growing inequality in the U.S. and the decline of work safety and standards of living.
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Posner on U.S. Labor and Unions
In 1998, author Barbara Ehrenreich (who has a Ph.D. in Biology), inspired by the rhetoric
surrounding welfare reform, wanted to find out if an American could prosper on jobs that paid
above the minimum wage.299 With this goal in mind, Ehrenreich spent the year by moving from
Florida to Maine to Minnesota, where she lived in the cheapest available lodgings while working
as a waitress, hotel maid, house cleaner, nursing home aide, and Wal-Mart salesperson.
Ehrenreich provided the following evaluation of her jobs, which were “physically demanding”:
All of these jobs were physically demanding, some of them even damaging if performed month
after month. The fact that I survived physically, that in a time period well into my fifties I never
collapsed or needed time off to recuperate, is something I am inordinately proud of.300

In January 2004, the conservative Heritage Foundation conceded that real wages had
been stagnant for some time and that the average real hourly earnings were slightly below $8.40
and in 1998 (the year of Ehrenreich’s research) it was about $7.80.301 Achieving economic
success, Ehrenreich learned, was not realistic and even basic survival was difficult. Indeed,
survival in the workplace is an issue for many U.S. workers.
When Ronald Reagan became President in 1980, the Occupational Safety and Heath
Administration (OSHA) had only 1300 inspectors for ensuring the safety of over 5 million
workplaces across the country.302 By 1981, Reagan slashed the number of OSHA inspectors by
20%.303 Furthermore, OSHA adopted a “voluntary compliance” policy, under which OSHA
inspectors had to inspect a company’s injury log before entering their plant.304
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As author Eric Schlosser noted, “OSHA’s voluntary compliance policy did indeed reduce
the number of recorded injuries in meatpacking plants. Id did not, however, reduce the number
of people getting hurt.”305 Over a three-month period in 1985, the Iowa Beef Packing company
(IBP) kept two injury logs: one for the slaughterhouse (located in Dakota City, Nebraska) and
one for OSHA.306 The first log recorded 1800 illnesses and injuries at the Nebraska plant. The
log given to OSHA recorded only 160—“a discrepancy of more than 1,000%.”307
A contributing factor to the mounting numbers of injuries (other than fraud and the
diminishing threat from OSHA) was, according to Schlosser, a decline in union membership:
In the days when labor unions were strong, workers could complain about excessive line speeds
and injury rates without fear of getting fired. Today only one-third of IBP’s belong to a union.
Most of the nonunion workers…are generally employed ‘at will.’ That means they can get fired
without warning, for just about any reason.308

Posner does give a balanced discussion on the pros and cons of labor unions. Posner’s analysis
of labor unions, however, does not comport to unions in the motion picture industry. For
instance, Posner says, “losers from the effect of unionization on wages are consumers in
unionized industries” because “those industries will pass along to their consumers a portion, at
least, of their higher labor costs.”309 As aforementioned, the increasing pace of runaway
production due to government incentives or cheap labor has not resulted in cheaper DVD’s or
movie theatre tickets or even cheaper movie t-shirts, which (of course) are also made abroad.
Worse yet, new technology like HD-DVD and Blu-Ray players are not affordable to average
consumers, who have spent billions on DVD players and titles.
There is little support that free trade/globalization reduces prices for consumers in the
movie industry specifically. Furthermore, even those in favor of free trade admit its drawbacks:
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According to historical data, a sizable portion of workers who lose their jobs because of free trade
do not easily find new ones or must accept jobs with lower wages. From 1979 to 1999, roughly 30
percent of the people who lost jobs as a result of cheap imports in sectors other than
manufacturing had not found jobs a year later. And for those who found new jobs, the wages in
the new jobs varied considerably. About a quarter actually found better-paid jobs, and on average,
wages in the new jobs were about the same as the wages in the jobs that had been lost.
Nevertheless, 55 percent took lower-paid jobs, and about 25 percent took pay cuts of 30 percent or
more.310

The economic picture of the world today is not unlike that of 1900 to 1929. The gap
between the worlds rich and poor today is almost the same as before the Great Depression and
workers wages, benefits and safety have slowly eroded. Is history repeating itself?

V. Runaway Production: Solutions and Problems
Tax Incentives As Subsidies: Corporate Welfare?
The FTAC is opposed to foreign and domestic subsidies, which they label “corporate
welfare.” The use of subsidies is a nebulous topic and an in-depth discussion of the economic
worth of subsidies is well beyond the reach of this paper.311 Scratching the surface of subsidies
as applied to the motion picture industry is, however, valuable. Leftist activist Ralph Nader first
coined the term “corporate welfare” in 1956. The use of corporate welfare (subsidies, tax
incentives, grants etc.) is not, however, a left-right issue. In June 1999, Stephen Moore, a
conservative economist with the CATO Institute and co-founder of the right-wing Club for
Growth, testified before the U.S. House Budget Committee on the issue of corporate welfare,
which Moore called, “egregious subsidies.”312
Moore addressed two arguments used by subsidy proponents:
Although it is said that corporate subsidies are necessary so that U.S. firms can compete with their
subsidized rivals in other nations, more than 90 percent of American businesses manage to stay in
310
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business without ever receiving government grants, loan guarantees, insurance, or airplane seats
on Commerce Department trade missions around the globe. But they pay higher taxes, which
lowers their competitiveness, to support those businesses that do.
Nor are these programs needed to save jobs. The Commerce Department's Advanced Technology
Program is advertised as a job producer. But from 1990-94 the ATP provided more than $250
million to eight firms--Amoco Corp., AT&T, Citicorp, DuPont, General Electric, General Motors,
IBM, and Motorola. Over those five years, these firms reduced their total U.S. workforces by
329,000.313

Moore makes a good argument against corporate subsidies in general, but the argument weakens
when applied to the movie industry. For instance, tax incentives for movies benefit numerous
small businesses (special effects firms, costume manufacturers etc) whose collaborative effort
results in a major motion picture. Further, because the Hollywood studio system no longer exists,
the movie arms of major corporations do not have large workforces to layoff (though the special
effects house that no longer gets studio contracts might have to reduce their workforce).
Louisiana’s tax incentives provide proof that subsidies draw movies. Thus, when it
comes to movies, tax incentives (at the least) create jobs. The reality is that subsidies, for better
or worse, exist at home and abroad and are needed to keep the movie industry in the U.S.
Moreover, if generous subsidies and tax incentives fail to pass, the U.S. and other industrialized
nations may lose the film industry to third world nations like Romania and Morocco.
Encouraging Signs From the States
Clearly Louisiana’s legislation has been wildly successful even in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Other states are taking notice. New Mexico, for example, has gone beyond
offering tax subsidies to establishing a fund to invest in movies. New Mexico offers no-interest
loans of up to $7.5 million, repayable over five years, so long as filmmakers do most of their
filming in the state and hire a crew made up of at least 60% New Mexico residents.314 New
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Mexico also offers a 25% tax rebate for every dollar spent in the state.315 Perhaps the best
incentive New Mexico offers is a mentor program that allows a 50% salary rebate for advancing
the skills of crew members hired for the first time or promoted to higher positions.316
As a result of these programs, within two years New Mexico went from having zero
movies filmed to 25 movies.317 In 2005, in an effort to remain competitive, New Mexico enacted
several new tax breaks and raised the loan amount to $15 million.318
Cost to state treasuries is the fundamental drawback to film incentives. At a time when
many states face large budget shortfalls, it remains unclear if film incentives can be justified.319
On the one hand, New Mexico’s incentives are not draining the state’s treasury and produce
positive economic impacts. For example, as of August 2006, New Mexico had loaned $146 to
film producers since the loan program was approved in 2002.320 As a result of New Mexico’s
loans, movie productions paid a total of $36 million to 2,256 New Mexico residents (i.e. not the
Hollywood talent) and spent $113 million within the state.321 In sum, states and local
governments study the various state incentives and perform a cost benefit analysis before hastily
enacting poorly thought out legislation.
Further compounding the cost-benefit problem is the lack of evidence, for the time being,
that the economic activity generated by movie productions will offset the cost to the states. It is
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possible that revenue streams flowing back to the state from an increase in film production may
take several years.
California, home to Hollywood, is an anomaly. The state provides no tax incentives or
subsidies whatsoever. Some state lawmakers have tried to enact legislation to address runaway
production and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger voiced his support, albeit tepid, for such
legislative efforts. Despite a lack of any state incentives, California seems to be faring well. In
2005, 61% of the budgets for domestic theatrical releases were spent in California as opposed to
50% in 1998. Conversely, in 1998, 62 films were made in California, but dropped to 46 films in
2005.
In sum, more money was spent on California films in 2005 than 1998, but the total
number of films made in California in 1998 than 2005. Perhaps it’s just a tradeoff. For the time
being, California may not feel the need to enact legislative handouts to the entertainment
industry because Hollywood remains the epicenter of filmmaking and the hundreds of allied
businesses (such as special effects shops) that create an unparalleled entertainment infrastructure.
For now.
Federal Jobs Creation Act of 2004: Did the Entertainment Industry Need It?
While this author generally supports film subsidies if done well (New Mexico, for
example, has a well-conceived plan whereas Louisiana may just be giving away the bank for
short term benefits), there have been some failures that give weight to Stephen Moore’s
arguments. Passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 is an example of unnecessary
handouts. Under the law, film and television productions can write-off 100% of incurred costs if
the following qualifications are met: (1) 75% of total compensation went to American actors,
directors, and other personnel involved in the production process; (2) the production must be
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performed in the United States; and (3) the aggregate cost of the film or television production
must be at or below $15 million.322
The law was unnecessary. In 1999, 87% of films with budgets under $15 million were
already shot in the U.S. (compared to 13% in Canada).323 In 2001, 67% of films with budgets
under $15 million filmed in the U.S. (compared to 35% in Canada, which was down from 52% in
2001)324. In short, the federal legislation targeted low budget films that were not running away.
In fact, the Republican-controlled Congress arguably showed its deep-rooted animus
towards Hollywood during the passage of the Federal Jobs Creation Act. When the MPAA
selected Dan Glickman, a former Democratic Congressman and President Clinton’s secretary of
agriculture, it angered key Republican leadership in the House and Senate, who felt a Republican
should have been appointed.325 It was rumored that Glickman’s hiring caused Republican to take
retribution against Hollywood. Led by then-Majority Leader Tom Delay (R-TX), House GOP
members on the conference committee voted as a block to oppose $1 billion in tax credits in a
$140 billion tax bill because they were too expensive.326
Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), was furious that the motion picture industry was singled
out in the legislation, noting the breaks on other businesses such as a NASCAR racetrack owners
$101 million write-off for improvements and Home Depot’s $44 million tariff suspension it
owes for importing Chinese ceiling fans.327 Feinstein claimed the final legislation will cost the
motion picture industry $5 billion over 10 years to accounting for revenues.328
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Federal Legislation That Would Help
The Louisiana and New Mexico models show how proactive legislation foster the movie
industry at highly successful levels.. Enactment of similar legislation at the federal level,
especially when combined with state incentives, could help stem the flow of runaway
productions to such an extent that a new economic boom that provides Americans with highly
skilled and highly paid jobs in an field that may be the last distinctively American industry left.
As the 2005 CEIDR report notes, “state incentives are working,” but there are caveats:
U.S. state incentives are working, but it is not clear if they are they keeping production from
leaving the U.S., or just moving them from one U.S. location to another, especially if a location
doesn't offer any incentive. State incentives on average are 15% of qualified labor which means
that a $25.00 per hour worker will cost the producer $21.25 an hour, comparatively, Canada saves
the producer an additional $6.76 (27%), Australia $2.61 (10%), and New Zealand $7.54, (30%).329

While the CEIDR report acknowledges the cost to the federal treasury, it offers a plan
where the benefits outweigh the costs:
While a U.S. Federally-based incentive would clearly have a cost to the Treasury, it is likely that it
would be a sound investment in our Country’s future and that results and benefits would
significantly outweigh the cost. By way of illustration…a 16% U.S., labor based tax credit could
gain 33,780 jobs and have a value of $3 billion to the economy, at a cost of $203 million, which
equals $1,200 per job. 330

The CEIDR report concludes with the following eloquent remarks that lawmakers would do well
to heed:
In the world today, globalization is an economic fact of life. Companies across the world are
seeking lower costs of manufacturing, distribution and operations. The growth of foreign
production of U.S. originated entertainment product, however, seems, to a significant measure, to
be driven by economic subsidies to producers as a conscious decision by countries seeking wellpaying jobs in a clean industry.
The question is with any job leaving the U.S. is, where and when does it stop. When
Canada was proposing their federal incentive their rallying call was, "These are the jobs
your children want." The U.S. must decide it they want feature film production careers
for their children, and their children’s children.331
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Other Solutions
Many states have no film commissions and those that do have slashed their budgets
because of budget shortfalls and other reasons. The United States is the only major nation that
does not have an organization at the federal-level to address the motion picture industry.332
The Commerce Report explains the value of a national film commission:
The commission could coordinate with state film commissions on how to attract film production
through streamlining bureaucratic processes, simplifying access to government-owned property
for filming, and standardizing licensing and permitting procedures. It could help to resolve
problems relating to film production and employment data and assist with uniform data collection.
Finally, the commission could publish periodic economic analyses of the industry.333

Other ideas to alleviate the problem of runaway productions include: government
sponsored training programs to ensure a steady supply of artists and film technicians in the U.S.;
Congressional hearings on runaway productions so lawmakers can gain a better understanding of
the issue and how it affects local communities; and better collection of industry data at the
national level to ensure better accuracy.
Conclusion: U.S. Motion Pictures--To Be, or Not to Be?
The movie industry is a national treasure that many Americans take for granted.
Simultaneously, many in America would agree that movies, studios, and Hollywood (as a
physical location and as a part of the American psyche) are treasures the nation should not export.
The U.S. is in a position to compete with Canada and other nations that offer incentives and it
must do so before runaway productions migrate to third world nations, which can beat the United
States in a race to the bottom. This paper has highlighted the economic consequences of losing
film productions and the dire conditions that exist in the third world—conditions that
globalization has arguably made worse. The U.S. should condemn the practices of third world
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governments that do not improve the lives of their residents as well as condemn the multinational
corporations that perpetuate the status quo. Admittedly, these are optimistic aspirations.
That said, Canadian Entertainment Attorney Joe Sisto offers assesses the sobering reality
of runaway productions and the failure by both the Clinton and Bush administrations as well as
Congress to pass measures to stop runaway production:
American film producers are in the business of producing film -- emphasis on ‘business.’
American producers admit that the costs of producing feature-length motion pictures in California
has become so prohibitively expensive that it simply makes good business sense to seek out viable
alternatives. Many worthy projects would otherwise simply die at the development stage.
In this light, the runaway production seems a rather tame and toothless beast when compared, for
instance, to the practice of U.S. auto manufacturers setting up shop in right-to-work states in order
to avoid the unions or in South America to gain access to cheap labor. U.S.-based pharmaceutical,
energy and aerospace companies typically operate across borders as well. The same applies to
banking, insurance and other financial institutions. There is a plethora of American companies in a
variety of industries that have moved permanently to Mexico and the Far East to reduce their labor
costs.
Ultimately, producers are in the business of making films and like every other sector of industry,
are not responsible for ensuring the survival of labor unions or subsidizing municipal operating
budgets. Producing a top-quality and commercially viable film or TV show at a significant
discount simply makes good business sense. And in fairness, it would seem perfectly reasonable
for U.S. government officials to attempt to level the playing field by offering financial incentives
to producers similar to those offered in other countries.
The market will dictate where projects are shot. The issue is not one for independents alone -- the
majors, themselves subsidiaries of multinational corporations, answer to shareholders and are no
longer beholden to Hollywood as a geographical must. The need to stretch a dollar to its
conceivable limit has inevitably led film and TV producers, among many other ‘manufacturers,’
beyond U.S. borders.334

Sisto’s analysis is accurate. It is not, however, too late for the U.S. government “to
attempt to level the playing field.” Americans, to borrow a line from Peter Finch’s character in
1976’s “Network,” need to say “we’re mad as hell and we’re not gonna take this anymore.” The
politically incorrect yet pragmatic solution is getting politicians to treat movie incentives like any
other pork barrel project. If a federal or state incentive results in a movie being made in a
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particular community (which benefits economically as a result), the constituency are likely to
reelect the politician that backed the incentive.
Unfortunately, most Americans are completely unaware of runaway production. Perhaps
the magic of movies has been too good at tricking Americans into thinking that American films
are made here. Employees at Wyoming’s Department of Tourism know that American
audiences were fooled after thousands of people across the nation called the department wanting
to know where Brokeback Mountain (the fictional location of the film “Brokeback Mountain,”
which was set in Wyoming ) was.335 But it wasn’t filmed in Wyoming; it was filmed in British
Columbia. There is little hope that runaway production will be the leading news story on
America’s media outlets because the same large conglomerates that own the studios own most of
the news outlets. In 2006, as of this writing, there is a glimmer of hope that the public is taking
notice of runaway productions.
The movie at issue is “Dallas,” a big screen version of the long-running television series.
Film commissioners from Toronto, Louisiana, and Florida were attempting to lure filming away
from Dallas.336 Dallas Mayor Laura Miller said, “The thought of ‘Dallas’ being made in Toronto
is not a good idea.”337 The Dallas Film Commission fought back, launching a “Shoot JR in
Dallas” public relation campaign to lure the film’s production.338 In addition, the Dallas Film
Commission asked private sector businesses in Dallas to offer incentives for the film. The film’s
producers estimate they would spend $30 million on the movie, which would have an economic
impact on the Dallas area of $62.6 million.339 The Dallas Film Commission estimates that the
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film would create 300 direct jobs and 650 indirect jobs.340 Increased tourism and free publicity
would also benefit the city. As the Dallas Film Commission says, “This is marketing we can not
afford to buy. The true impact of this is immeasurable.”341
The Dallas Film Commission’s web site urges city residents to help by purchasing hats,
shirts and bumper stickers bearing the “Shoot JR in Dallas” slogan. The Dallas Film
Commission claims the city has lost 24 productions with budgets totaling $500 million.342 The
Dallas Film Commission says losing the film would be a “black eye on the industry…why shoot
a film here if ‘Dallas’ won’t shoot here?”343
The Texas State Legislature passed a bill in 2005 to offer a $750,000 rebate for
production costs, but the initiative remains unfunded.344 Michael Costigan, a co-producer of the
film, told the local press that he would like to “make the whole film in Dallas” but cautioned,
“It’s now going to come down to really making the numbers work with our studio (20th Century
Fox).”345
As of this writing, Dallas has received good news. There is no further talk of filming in
Canada or Florida. In June 2006, 20th Century Fox informed the Dallas Film Commission they
planned to shoot in Dallas for four weeks, instead of the four or five days of filming 20th Century
Fox initially planned.346 So, while still tentative, Dallas will get four weeks of filming and
Shreveport, Louisiana will get eight.347 Janice Burklund, Director of the Dallas Film
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Commission, said “The public awareness that we’ve gotten out of this has been a big deal. I
think it’s kind of worked as an ad campaign.”348
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